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ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues that territorial dispute, regional geopolitics, and economic competition, 
catalyzed by misperceptions, will ensure that Sino-India relations remain competitive in 
nature. However, the high costs of war, growing economic interaction, and the imperative 
for peaceful economic development will help keep the nature of competition to a 
pragmatic level through 2020. Worth noting is that nations engaged in pragmatic 
competition continue to factor in ―the other‖ as a potential enemy for military planning 
purposes.  
To stabilize pragmatism in Sino-India relations this thesis recommends a three-
pronged strategy for India: build trust; ensure credible deterrence; and, promote economic 
and regional cooperation. To be forthcoming without appearing weak must be India‘s 
mantra.    
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India and China find themselves on the cusp of history1 
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND RATIONALE 
China is not an important civilization and a fast-growing power ―out there,‖ it is 
India‘s largest neighbor ―right here‖; in this, lies the significance of studying Sino-India 
relations. India and China emerged from the shadows of colonial rule around the same 
time, and marched on separate paths for their tryst with destiny. While India adopted a 
democratic form of government in 1947, in 1949 the Communists took the reins of China 
in their hand. The complex nature of Sino-India relations was evident within the first 
fifteen years of their bilateral relations: changing from promises of eternal friendship to a 
border war in 1962. The dual nature of Sino-India relations has been a recurrent 
phenomenon throughout modern history. Ranging from hardened stands on the border 
issue to recognition (by India) of Tibet as part of China; from competitive bidding for 
energy resources to increasing bilateral trade; from perceptions of encirclement to 
increased cooperation in multilateral fora, Sino-India relations are an intricate web of 
interests. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the prospects of Sino-India relations in 
2020. The scope of the thesis will focus upon the core issues of the border dispute, 
regional geopolitics, and economic relations. The thesis acknowledges the important role 
played by the U.S. in Asia, and its profound influence on Sino-India relations; however, 
the triangular relationship between the U.S., China, and India is beyond the scope of the 
thesis. 
Conceptually, realism and liberalism both offer different explanations, 
predictions, and prescriptions for the past, present, and future of Sino-India relations. 
Varying perceptions of China in India, and which international relations paradigm one 
favors help determine analysts‘ outlook. Often people look at only one part of the puzzle, 
                                                 
1  David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, "India and China: Conflict and Cooperation," Survival 52, 
no. 1 (February 2010), 154. 
 2 
and thus sacrifice clarity and coherence. The rise of two countries in the same geographic 
region has historically been a cause of conflict; India and China have themselves fallen 
prey to those tensions a number of times. Whether China and India will re-engage in 
hostilities due to hegemonic aspirations, or establish interdependence and live up to the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, as enshrined in the Panchsheel will depend on 
whether both sides fully appreciate the forces buffeting them. The prospect of two 
nuclear armed states engaging in hostilities is too fearsome to contemplate on the one 
hand, while the potential for bringing greater levels of prosperity to one-third of mankind 
would seem overwhelmingly alluring on the other.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question for this thesis is, ―What are the prospects for Sino India 
Relations in 2020?‖ This thesis will be explanatory in nature, and contribute to the 
momentous debate about the future of Sino-India relations.  
C. TYPOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES 
The prevalent literature on Sino-India relations is grounded in competing 
international relations (IR) theories, and hence a brief overview of relevant theories is in 
order; this is followed by an overview of the literature about Sino-India relations. 
1. Realism 
Kenneth Waltz‘s ‗Theory of International Politics‘ is one of the most influential 
IR theories.2  Rooted in assumptions about anarchy and the struggle for survival, realists 
see the world as an arena of competition.3 Waltz prescribes a balance of power as the best 




                                                 
2 Ole Waever, "Waltz's Theory of Theory," International Relations 23, no. 2 (2009), 202. 
3 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). 
 3 
in international relations. Waltz‘s theory has been further expanded by Stephen Walt, into 
something known as balance of threat.4 Under the realist umbrella there are two major 
variants: offensive and defensive realism.5 
a. Offensive Realism 
John Mearsheimer builds upon the context of anarchy and adds three 
assumptions to Waltz‘s theory: rationality, offensive capabilities, and uncertain 
intentions.6 Pursuit of hegemonic power, rather than balance of power, is the offensive 
realist‘s route to survival.7 Mearsheimer also adds nonstructural variables to the realist 
frame in the form of regional and global geopolitics.8 The offensive realists predict more 
war and competition, especially when a power maximizing state collides with the 
balancing actions of a security seeker. Critics point to offensive realists‘ pessimism and 
their inability to explain incidents of cooperation in international relations. Critics also 
contend that offensive realists fail to appreciate how uncertainty itself may be a reason 
for states to cooperate, and that cooperation is also a form of self-help.9 
b. Defensive Realism 
Defensive realists envision more possibilities of cooperation under certain 
sets of conditions. Robert Jervis argues that two security-seeking states may inadvertently 
end up hurting each other‘s security, thereby setting off a spiral leading to war. He 
explains Britain‘s dilemma with respect to the security of maritime routes to its colonies, 
and Germany‘s apprehensions over the rise of Russia before World War II in these terms. 
The dynamics at work between the U.S. and China during the Korean War also exemplify 
                                                 
4 Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning," in International Politics, Enduring 
Concepts and Contemporary Issues, eds. Robert C. Art and Robert Jervis, Fourth ed. (New York: Harper 
Collins College Publishers, 1996), 108–115. 
5 Waever, Waltz's Theory of Theory, 201–222. 
6 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Peter Toft, "John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist between Geopolitics and Power," Journal of 
International Relations and Development 8, no. 4 (2005), 381–408. 
9 Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security 19, no. 3 
(1995), 50–90. 
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how states can be drawn into conflict due to perceived threats to sovereignty and 
security.10 According to defensive realists, the security dilemma is intractable, but can be 
mitigated through signaling, balance and differentiation of offensive and defensive 
means.11 Conversely, territorial disputes, interests other than security, misperceptions, and 
aggressive policies make the security dilemma insolvable.12 The Cold War is an example 
of how certain conflicts may well be a product of irreconcilable differences and a security 
dilemma.13 Defensive Realists falter over the prospects of a greedy state intentionally 
misrepresenting its motives, and they also have a hard time managing irreducible 
uncertainty. Under such situations, they lean back on robust offensive realist solutions 
grounded in power and deterrence.14 The take-away from realism is that states that are not 
conscious of the security dilemma and the spiral effects it can generate may do nothing to 
mitigate it, and thereby be cursed into a hostile relationship. 
2. Liberalism 
Liberals see the world through a qualitatively different eyepiece, and grant actors 
more scope and reason to cooperate. In game theory terms, they insist that the world is far 
from pareto relations. The interstate relations in Europe after World War II, and the 
interdependence of the U.S. and the West European states are examples they cite of peace 
through democracy, institutional mechanisms, and economic interdependence.15 The 
liberals, however, fall short when it comes to explaining the likely outcome when 
                                                 
10 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," 
International Security 25, no. 3 (2000), 128–161. 
11 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978), 
167–214. 
12 Ibid; Alan Collins, "State-Induced Security Dilemma: Maintaining the Tragedy," Cooperation and 
Conflict 39, no. 1 (2004), 27–44; Taliaferro, Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited, 
128–161; Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics 50, no. 1 (October 1997), 
171–201. 
13 Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," International Security 24, no. 1 (1999), 
42–63. 
14 Glaser, The Security Dilemma Revisited, 171–201; Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security 
Dilemma, 167–214; Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation, 42–63. 
15 Benjamin Miller, "Contrasting Explanations for Peace: Realism Vs. Liberalism in Europe and the 
Middle East," Contemporary Security Policy 31, no. 1 (April 2010), 134–164. 
 5 
democracies face autocratic states, or when vital interests clash.16 Nor can they deny the 
need for states to assert comparable capabilities under such circumstances. 
D. LITERATURE ON PROSPECTS OF SINO-INDIA RELATIONS 
The three main positions articulated in the literature addressing the prospects of 
Sino-India relations include the hyper-realists, appeasers, and pragmatists.17 These 
positions correspond to perceptions about China as a clear and present danger, as a 
benign neighbor, and as a long-term competitor that can be managed through 
engagement.18 Conceptually, these frameworks draw inspiration from the IR theories of 
realism and liberalism, with the pragmatists following the middle path based on defensive 
realism. 
1. Hyper-Realists  
Hyper-realists argue that due to the border dispute, the prospects of improvement 
in Sino-India relations are unlikely.19 Beijing‘s lack of alacrity over the border issue is 
viewed as strategic ambiguity aimed at containing India‘s rise. 20 Hyper-realists argue that 
geopolitics dominates the Sino-India relationship.21 China's relationship with Pakistan, 
and forays in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), are seen as encirclement strategies, 
prompting India's Look East policy.22 This competition is accentuated due to the 
                                                 
16 Miller, "Contrasting Explanations for Peace‖; Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation, 42–
63. 
17 Mohan J. Malik, Eyeing the Dragon: India's China Debate Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies 
[2003]). 
18 Steven Hoffmann, "Perception and China Policy in India," in The India-China Relationship: What 
the U.S. Needs to Know, eds. Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding (Irvington: Columbia University 
Press, 2004), 33–74; Amitabh Mattoo and Kanti Bajpai, eds., The Peacock and the Dragon: India China 
Relations in the 21st Century (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Pvt Ltd, 2000), 491. 
19 Sumit Ganguly, "India and China: Border Issues, Domestic Integration, and International Security," 
in The India-China Relationship: What the U.S. Needs to Know, eds. Francine R. Frankel and Harry 
Harding (Irvington: Columbia University Press, 2004), 103–133. 
20 Ibid. 
21 David Scott, "The Great Power 'Great Game' between India and China: 'the Logic of Geography'," 
Geopolitics 13, no. 1 (2008), 1–26. 
22 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2001), 447. 
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increasing energy demands in both countries. However, there are empirical incongruities 
in this literature that lie in hyper-realists‘ inability to explain occasions of cooperation in 
Sino-Indian relations. The hardliner prescriptions also run the danger of pushing India 
and China down the path of an arms race and increasing the chances of conflict.  
2. Liberals 
Liberals predict that the imperative for economic development will propel India 
and China towards peace. In 2009, China became India's largest trading partner, with 
trade touching approximately $40 billion; experts point out that there is the potential for 
further increase.23 The liberals feel that India and China‘s economies have advantages in 
different sectors, thus they are complementary.24 This theory sees greater convergence 
between India and China on issues relating to global economic governance, and views the 
border conflict as a legacy of the past.25 If the hyper-realists are pessimists, we could say 
the liberals are guilty of wishful thinking. While citing growing trade, they overlook 
imbalances and the lack of interdependence in that trade. Their analysis ignores, for 
instance, that despite China's extensive trade with Japan and Taiwan both have 
difficulties in resolving their political differences with China. 
3. Pragmatists  
Over the past few years there has been a realization among analysts in India that 
the prospects of Sino-India relations are not a case of conflict OR cooperation, but 
conflict AND cooperation. They acknowledge the primacy of the border issue, but 
highlight the efforts to resolve the dispute; they foresee the competition for resources, but 
also place hope on growing trade; they do not wish away China's maneuvers in the IOR, 
but also acknowledge the security dilemma.26 The pragmatists appreciate that neither 
                                                 
23 Zhang Guihong, "China's Peaceful Rise and Sino-Indian Relations," China Report 41, no. 2 (2005), 
159–171. 
24 Mark W. Frazier, "Quiet Competition and the Future of Sino-Indian Relations," in The India-China 
Relationship: What the U.S. Needs to Know (Irvington: Columbia University Press, 2004), 294–318. 
25 Bill Emmott, Rivals (Orlando: Penguin Books, 2009), 315. 
26 John W. Garver, "The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations," Indian Review 1, no. 4 (October 
2002), 1–38. 
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country stands to gain from a regional conflict. The pragmatic framework, despite its 
strengths, is a consequence of analysts adopting the path of least resistance when faced 
with a plethora of views. Their prescriptions lean toward appeasement and do not 
address, for instance, China‘s growing and opaque military budget.27 
In summary, the literature on Sino-India relations is colored by these IR 
paradigms; each research tradition provides a piece that helps make sense of the bilateral 
relations, but fails to provide a comprehensive framework. The empirically incongruent 
and overly pessimistic/optimistic views propagated by realists/liberals, and the ambiguity 
embraced by the pragmatists are major weaknesses. This thesis overcomes them by 
developing a coherent framework that acknowledges the countervailing pressures of 
competition and cooperation, and addresses the core issues of the border dispute, 
geopolitics, and economic relations.  
E. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The complex web of power, security, perceptions, and interdependence is not 
unique to Sino-India relations. In China's relationship with Taiwan we see strong 
evidence of power and competition, reinforced by the constructed ideas of Chinese 
sovereignty. However, one also cannot ignore the security dilemma on both sides, at the 
same time there is growing economic interaction with its positive fallout.28 Similarly, 
China's relationship with Japan reflects a mix of realist, liberalist, and constructivist 
elements. The deterrence value of the U.S.-Japan alliance and ambiguities about the role 
of Japan during a future Taiwan crisis reflect shades of both offensive and defensive 
realism. While Sino-centric images of Asia and memories of humiliation at the hands of 
the Japanese add to the competition, their growing bilateral trade and interactions in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) have assumed significant momentum. Peter Katzenstein, for instance, recognizes 
                                                 
27 Harsh V. Pant, "Indian Foreign Policy and China," Strategic Analysis 30, no. 4 (October-December, 
2006), 760–780; Elinor Sloan, China's Strategic Behaviour (Canada: Canadian Defence and Foreign 
Affairs Institute [2010]). 
28 From class notes of the course on Chinese Foreign Policy, at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey. The course is conducted by Dr. Christopher Twomey. 
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the complexity of causal mechanisms in international relations, and suggests that analytic 
eclecticism helps in transgressing the rigid boundaries of pure paradigms, and leads to an 
integrated, problem-oriented approach.29 Borrowing from this perspective, this thesis 
focuses on the border dispute, geopolitics, and economic interactions by way of realism, 
constructivism, and liberalism. 
The prospect of relations between any two countries can be understood as purely 
competitive, pragmatic, or purely cooperative. Competitive relations are marked by use 
or display of force, asymmetric warfare, and containment policies. Cooperative relations 
imply the absence or unimportance of differences, and relations are marked by a high 
level of societal exchange, mature institutions, open borders, and complex 
interdependence. If competition and cooperation identify the left and right extremes of 
the spectrum, pragmatism lies at the center. Pragmatic competition is marked by 
negotiations short of reconciliation, and substantial engagement by government and non-
government organizations. However, nations engaged in pragmatic competition continue 
to factor in the ‗other‘ as a potential enemy for military planning purposes. Incidents of 
violence cannot be ruled out, but are few and far between. 
 
                                                 
29 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobua Okowara, "Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytic 
Eclecticism," International Security 26, no. 3 (2001), 153–185. 
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Figure 1.   Analytic Eclecticism and Sino-India Relations 
The key argument of this thesis is that the border dispute, regional geopolitics, 
and economic competition, catalyzed by misperceptions, ensure that Sino-India relations 
will be competitive in nature. However, rising bilateral trade, and the imperative for 
peaceful economic development will keep the level and nature of competition at a 
pragmatic level through 2020. This thesis assumes that both India and China are rational 
actors motivated by self-interest, and acknowledges antecedent conditions to include 
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geography, different political systems, and conflicting claims related to inter-state 
borders. The three sub-arguments to be examined relate to the border dispute, geopolitics, 
and economic relations.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Key Argument of the Thesis 
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is based upon the single case study of Sino-India relations extending 
over the past six decades. Chapter II presents a historical narrative of the Sino-India 
border dispute, and analyzes it from a theoretical perspective. The border conflict 
between China and India continues to be the most contentious issue between the two 
countries, causing their relationship to be competitive.30 The intricate connection of this 
dispute with the Tibetan issue suggests that it menaces China‘s construction of identity 
and regime legitimacy, thus adding to the security dilemma. Since 1988, both countries 
have consciously tried to build confidence with each other, through Confidence Building 
Measures (CBMs). However, the Sino-India border remains the only major territorial 
                                                 














dispute, other than South China Sea disputes, that China has not resolved. China‘s 
growing assertiveness in its territorial claims, especially on Arunachal Pradesh, and its 
relentless development of infrastructure in Tibet will shape the prospects of Sino-India 
relations by 2020.  
Chapter III argues that the significance of geopolitics for Sino-India relations is 
evident in China‘s attempts to flex its muscles and exert its influence in India‘s 
immediate neighborhood. Consequently, the perceptions of strategic encirclement drive 
the regional competition and security dilemma between the two countries.31 This chapter 
identifies three distinct aspects of geopolitics in Sino-India relations: firstly, the attempt 
by China to constrain India; secondly, the fact that India and China occupy the same 
territorial and maritime arena, and therefore even when motivated by rational self-
interest, the two countries rub up against each other; and thirdly, China‘s imperative to 
secure its Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) drives it to create assets in the IOR 
that are detrimental to India‘s long-term interests. This chapter surmises that by 2020, 
China‘s nexus with Pakistan, its forays into the IOR, and India‘s Look East Policy will 
shape the geopolitical context for their relationship.  
Chapter IV reflects that India and China‘s economic development, best indicated 
by their burgeoning Gross Domestic Product (GDP), already has a profound influence on 
their mutual relationship. The foremost way in which economic development affects 
Sino-India relations is to have established the need to ensure a peaceful environment as 
both countries strive to transition from developing to developed countries. The growth in 
bilateral trade between India and China belies all realist-constructivist prophecies rooted 
in power and perceptions; however, significant questions remain with respect to trade 
imbalances, and security concerns. Moreover, economic development has also 
correspondingly increased the energy requirements of both nations, thus competition for 
energy resources is likely to add to the rivalry in their relationship.32  
                                                 
31 Gurpreet S. Khurana, "China's 'String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean and its Security Implications," 
Strategic Analysis 32, no. 1 (January 2008), 3; Anindya Batabyal, "Balancing China in Asia, A Realist 
Assessment of India's Look East Strategy," China Report 42, no. 2 (2006), 181. 
32 Jonathan Holslag, "Fuelling Competition? China and India's Need for Natural Resources and the 
Options for Cooperation," BICCS Asia Paper 3, no. 3 (January 2008), 3. 
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Chapter V presents a prognosis for Sino-India relations in 2020. The dilemma 
over China‘s future role and intentions implies that India will need to draft adequate 
safeguards in terms of internal and soft balancing to deny any misconceptions about an 
easy victory in war. This final chapter explores how India‘s strategic choices may add to 




II. SINO-INDIA TERRITORIAL DISPUTE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
India‘s first Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, envisioned eternal 
friendship with China as the foundation for Asian prosperity; these expectations were 
enshrined in the five principles of peaceful coexistence. However, the optimism 
surrounding Sino-India relations was eclipsed by the China‘s 1950 occupation of Tibet 
and shattered by the 1962 Sino-India War. The territorial dispute between India and 
China remains the major sore point between the two countries; not only does it threaten 
India‘s territorial sovereignty, but casts a shadow on cooperation in other fields, and 
unnerves planners wondering about future intentions.  
The territorial dispute between India and China is a legacy of the colonial era 
when Britain was involved in the great game with Russia in Central Asia, and sought to 
influence Tibet. The present day dispute is centered around the 40,000 km² of territory 
controlled by China in the Western Sector of the Himalayas, called Aksai Chin; and, the 
92,000 km² of territory controlled by India on the Eastern flank, i.e., the Indian state of 
Arunachal Pradesh.  
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Figure 3.   Sino-India Border Dispute: Western and Eastern Sectors33 
                                                 
33 China-India Border, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_indiae_border_88.jpg. 
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This chapter narrates a historical account of the Sino-India territorial dispute, and 
then presents a theory-driven analysis of the conflict. The key argument is that the 
territorial dispute threatens the sovereignty of both nations, and by virtue of its intricate 
relationship with the Tibet issue also threatens the Chinese construct of honor, identity, 
and regime legitimacy. Developments since 1988 reflect that both sides are sensitive to 
the high costs and low benefits of an armed conflict and have thus exercised restraint. 
However, in the wake of lingering underlying differences, a mutually satisfactory 
resolution of the border conflict is not in sight. Hegemonic aspirations in the region and 
perceived threats to its sovereignty have prompted China to nurture the border conflict as 
a strategic lever against India, thus accentuating the security dilemma. Therefore, unless 
something significant changes, the border dispute will continue to cause competition and 
rivalry in Sino-India relations, albeit at a pragmatic level.  
B. HISTORY OF SINO-INDIA BORDER DISPUTE 
1. Colonial Legacy and the Sino–India War of 1962 
Aksai Chin was left under British control under the 1904 Anglo–Tibetan treaty, 
whereas the McMahon line agreed to by British and Tibetan officers at Shimla in October 
1914 placed the border to the East. The 1904 treaty was rejected by the Qing Dynasty in 
China, and despite attendance and tacit acceptance of the McMahon Line by the resident 
Chinese representative, Beijing did not sign the 1914 treaty.34  
On assuming power, the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) renounced all prior 
foreign agreements as unequal treaties imposed upon it during the ―century of 
humiliation‖ and demanded renegotiation of all borders.35 The Chinese annexation of 
Tibet in 1950 brought the reality of an expansionist power closer to the consciousness of 
Indian leaders, but, with strong convictions over Indian-Chinese friendship, Nehru acted 
pragmatically and did not support Tibet's independence. However, repudiation of the 
                                                 
34  David Scott, "Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century," Asian Security 4, 
no. 3 (2008), 250. 
35  Neville Maxwell, India's China War, First American Edition ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1970), 63. 
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McMahon line by the Chinese brought to the fore the differences in perceptions of the 
Sino-India border, with direct repercussions for India's own territorial integrity. The 
granting of asylum to the Dalai Lama and his followers in 1959 made China equally 
apprehensive about India's long-term intentions. The discovery of a Chinese road having 
been built in Aksai Chin as a communication link between Xinjiang and Tibet renewed 
Indian fears and sparked a flurry of activities. The diplomatic failure to resolve the border 
dispute, and growing misperceptions, prompted India to pursue an ill-fated Forward 
Policy aimed at establishing poorly tasked and poorly equipped military outposts along 
India's version of the border. Moves and counter-moves finally led to the Sino–India War 
in October 1962. Militarily, the Chinese victory was complete and India's defeat 
absolute.36 The war was a watershed for India, deeply affecting its psyche.37 With the 
death of Nehru in 1964, the dreams of ‗Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai‘ (Indians and Chinese are 
brothers) were laid to rest.38 In 1967, there was another bout of artillery fire and a border 
skirmish at Chola in the Eastern Sector, highlighting the sensitivities surrounding the 
border dispute and the danger of inadvertent escalation.39  
2. Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh 
In 1975, Sikkim became a part of India, sparking protests by the Chinese who 
viewed this as an affront to their territorial integrity. Notably, in 1976, the Chinese 
entered into nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.40 A ray of hope emerged when Deng 




                                                 
36  Maxwell, India's China War, 418–420. 
37  Malone and Mukherjee, India and China: Conflict and Cooperation, 141. 
38 Surjit Mansingh, "Rising China and Emergent India in the 21st Century: Friends Or Rivals?" The 
Korean Journal of Defence Analysis XIX, no. 4 (2007), 123. 
39  My battalion, 7/11 Gorkha Rifles took part in the battle at Chola. One of our Jawaans, Rifleman 
Debi Prasad Limbu chopped the heads of five Chinese soldiers with his Khukhri before succumbing to his 
injuries, and was posthumously honored with Veer Chakra, a gallantry award. 
40  Malone and Mukherjee, India and China: Conflict and Cooperation, 142. 
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development. This was followed by a visit by then-Indian Foreign Minister Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee in 1979. However, China's Pedagogical War against Vietnam overshadowed 
any prospects of improving relations.41 
In 1986, India granted statehood to Arunachal Pradesh, sparking a fresh round of 
hostilities. In order to assert its claim over the entire Eastern sector, China mobilized 
large number of troops in Tibet opposite Sumdurong Chu Valley, which lies at the tri-
junction of India, China, and Bhutan.42 India responded with a military exercise named 
Chequerboard, bringing the two sides into eyeball-to-eyeball contact on a mass scale. 
The confrontation was de-escalated short of an armed conflict, but reinforced volatility 
on the borders.43 The impasse was broken by then-Indian Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi‘s 
visit to China in 1988. This visit, the first after nearly a quarter century, reduced tensions 
and paved the way for future negotiations. More importantly, India accepted that the 
settlement of the border dispute no longer needed to be a condition for the improvement 
of bilateral relations.44 India‘s acknowledgement that some elements among the Tibetan 
refugees in India were involved in anti-China activities was a major concession, and a 
reminder of China's sensitivities with respect to Tibet and its intricate relationship to the 
Sino-India territorial dispute.  
3. End of the Cold War 
Events in Tiananmen Square in 1989 partially slowed the progress in the 
normalization of bilateral relations, which was resumed with the signing of two important 
agreements: the 1993 agreement for peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual 
Control (LAC), and the 1996 agreement for CBMs related to military affairs. These 
agreements provided for regular flag meetings, significant troop reductions, notification 
regarding military exercises involving more than one division, the prohibition of combat 
                                                 
41  Ganguly, India and China: Border Issues, Domestic Integration, and International Security, 121. 
42  Mansingh, Rising China and Emergent India in the 21st Century: Friends Or Rivals? 122–124; 
Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 105. 
43  Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, "Resolving the Sino-Indian Border Dispute: 
Building Confidence through Cooperative Monitoring," Asian Survey 41, no. 2 (2001), 353. 
44  Ganguly, India and China: Border Issues, Domestic Integration, and International Security, 122. 
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aircraft within 10 km of the LAC, and self-restraint in situations of face-to-face 
confrontation.45 A central question still eluded the negotiators as they agreed upon these 
CBMs: the precise location of the LAC!46 However, the two sides agreed to seek a fair, 
reasonable, and mutually acceptable settlement of the border dispute.  
Some of the gains made over the last decade were lost in the aftermath of India's 
nuclear tests in 1998, and the mention by the Indian Defense Minister that China was 
India's greatest threat only days before the tests occurred. The situation deteriorated 
further due to leaks by Washington of a private letter written by Prime Minister Vajpayee 
to President Clinton, citing the unresolved border dispute and the atmosphere of distrust 
with China as primary factors for India's nuclear tests.47 China‘s neutrality during the 
1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan, helped overcome the hiccups of the 
previous year.48 
4. Glimmer of Hope „OR‟ Déjà Vu  
In 2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee visited China, a trip that was reciprocated by 
Premier Wen Jia Bao's visit to India in 2005. These two interactions marked significant 
improvement in Sino-India relations. While India reasserted that it recognized the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR) as part of the PRC, China subsequently accepted Sikkim as 
part of India.49 These negotiations opened the way to establishment of cross-border trade 
at Nathu La in Sikkim, reviving hopes of resolving the border dispute.50 However, these 
hopes were short-lived! 
On the eve of President Hu Jintao‘s state visit to India in November 2006, China 
reasserted its claims to the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, describing it as ―Southern 
                                                 
45  Sidhu and Yuan, Resolving the Sino-Indian Border Dispute: Building Confidence through 
Cooperative Monitoring, 361. 
46  Ganguly, India and China: Border Issues, Domestic Integration, and International Security, 124. 
47  Mansingh, Rising China and Emergent India in the 21st Century: Friends Or Rivals? 128. 
48  Malone and Mukherjee, India and China: Conflict and Cooperation, 142. 
49  Mansingh, Rising China and Emergent India in the 21st Century: Friends Or Rivals? 130. 
50  Kuei-hsing Hsu, The Impact of Opening Up Sikkim's Nathu-La on China-India Eastern Border 
Trade (Taiwan: National Chengchi University [2005]). 
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Tibet.‖ The controversy was reignited in 2007 when China denied a visa to an Indian 
Civil Services Officer of the Arunachal Pradesh cadre. New Delhi responded by 
cancelling the entire visit.51 In 2006, China had also opened the Lhasa railway line, 
drawing attention to the enormous pace of infrastructure development in Tibet. The 
difference this made by enabling a faster and larger military buildup in Tibet had serious 
implications for India's security. The symbolism inherent in a small contingent of the 
People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) being part of the inaugural run was not lost on 
observers.  
Amidst rhetoric about the ‗China threat‘ India augmented its own road and 
airfield infrastructure in the North East, including forward deployment of Sukhoi 30s.52 
China protested the visits by the Indian Prime Minister and President to Arunachal 
Pradesh in 2008, and also prevented the Asian Development Bank (ADB) from funding a 
hydro-project in the state. The sharp increases in patrol violations in all sectors of the 
disputed border between 2007 and 2009, and the force projections opposite the Chumbi 
Valley near Bhutan, were a grim reminder of the fact that China has resolved most of its 
international border disputes other than with India and Bhutan. The reports of 
infringements made analysts in India ask ominously, ―is China desperate to teach India 
another lesson?‖53  
The 2009 visit by the Dalai Lama to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, home of the 
second most revered Tibetan monastery in the world, heightened tensions between the 
two countries again. The previous year, the Indian government had taken great pains to 
ensure that Tibetan protesters did not cause any embarrassment to Beijing during the 
passage of the Olympic torch through New Delhi. However, the Dalai Lama's visit 
revived some of China‘s deep-seated fears with respect to Tibetan refugees in India.54 
                                                 
51  Mansingh, Rising China and Emergent India in the 21st Century: Friends Or Rivals? 133. 
52  Jabin T. Jacob, "The Qinghai-Tibet Railway and Nathu-La Challenge and Opportunity for India," 
China Report 43, no. 1 (2007), 84–85. 
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54  Malone and Mukherjee, India and China: Conflict and Cooperation, 146. 
 20 
5. East-West Swap and Tawang 
China, in 1960 and again in the 1980s, guardedly suggested the possibility of 
resolving the border dispute through an East-West Swap. However, it never presented 
these as concrete proposals. No doubt, one reason China did not make official 
concessions was to allow greater maneuverability and deniability during negotiations; the 
denial came in 1985. India, for its part, has been equally intransigent on the issue. Nehru 
and subsequent leaders have rejected the swap offer in the past, and there is a 
parliamentary resolution that disallows any swap of what is regarded as India‘s territory. 
The general sense of the Indian establishment is best summarized in an analogy from a 
legal expert on the border issue: ―If a thief breaks into your house and steals your coat 
and your wallet, you don’t say to him that he can have the coat if he returns the wallet. 
You expect him to return all that he has stolen from you.‖55 What has made matters worse 
is that even the informal offers from China have come with a caveat: Tawang, the North 
Western district of Arunachal Pradesh, the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama, and the 
seat of a major monastery was to be excluded, something that was not acceptable to the 
Indians.56 Because of its sensitivity to the Tibetan connection with Tawang, China 
remains unrelenting about this. Faced with an unyielding India, China has renewed its 
official claims over the entire Arunachal Pradesh for a stronger bargaining position. 
Finally, from an Indian perspective China‘s withdrawal of the swap offer, and fresh 
claims to the Eastern Sector have been seen as indicators of China‘s malign intent all 
along!  
C. ANALYSIS OF SINO-INDIA TERRITORIAL DISPUTE 
Examining the history of the Sino-India territorial dispute through a lens that 
takes into account power, security, identity, and perceptions, it becomes easier to 
understand why offensive and defensive realists point to China‘s hegemonic aspirations 
and threats to India‘s territorial sovereignty as the driving factors of the border dispute 
between India and China. However, it is also easy to see why constructivists might 
                                                 
55  Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 103. 
56  Neville Maxwell, "Forty Years of Folly," Critical Asian Studies 35, no. 1 (2003), 48. 
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suggest that the PRC is sensitive about its experiences given its prior century of 
humiliation, and therefore views India‘s claims to the borders drawn by the British as 
irredentist, and an affront to China‘s honor and identity. Both views also help explain 
why the PRC would fear that its internal cohesion and regime legitimacy can be 
undermined by secessionism in Tibet, assisted by India. The spiraling effect of these 
realist and constructivist forces is illustrated in the succeeding paragraph.  
The annexation of Tibet in 1950 and construction of a road in Aksai Chin played 
directly into the fears of security planners in India, prompting the Forward Policy. The 
deployment by the Indian Army, though purely defensive, then threatened China‘s sense 
of security; misperceptions, the lack of effective deterrence measures, the expectation of 
cheap victory, and a window of opportunity finally led to the 1962 war. The refuge India 
provides to the Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetans continues to cause much angst and 
anxiety in Beijing, and India‘s support to a Tibetan para-military force feeds into 
Beijing‘s deepest apprehensions that India will, at a future date, support a Tibetan 
rebellion and undermine Chinese sovereignty in complicity with the U.S.57 Similar 
dynamics can be seen at work after India granted statehood to Arunachal Pradesh. 
However, that crisis was diffused short of an armed conflict. Significantly, this thaw was 
not due to the conflict being resolved, but to the mutual recognition of the prohibitive 
costs of war, China‘s focus on peaceful economic development, Indian diplomacy, and 
India‘s readiness to address China‘s fears over Tibet. While the CBMs of 1993 and 1996, 
recognition of Sikkim as part of India by China, India‘s affirmation of its stand on Tibet, 
and revival of border trade in 2006 have been costly signals aimed at resolving the 
dispute, there is a growing pragmatism in Sino-India bilateral relations and a tacit 
realization that engaging in armed hostilities would be imprudent. Of course, it remains 
to be seen whether this stance marks a permanent change in China‘s orientation towards 
its territorial dispute with India, or whether China is playing for time so that it can 
maximize its Comprehensive National Power (CNP) under peaceful conditions, and then 
seek a resolution under a balance of power that favors it.  
                                                 
57  Garver, The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations, 6. 
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China has traditionally ascribed high value to territorial disputes, and is disposed 
to employ overwhelming force. Nevertheless, in order to support development, the PRC 
has resolved most of its territorial disputes; curiously, except with India!58 The frantic 
pace of infrastructure development in Tibet and claims on Arunachal Pradesh can be 
viewed as indicators that China is purposely engaging in strategic ambiguity. Certainly, 
misgivings over China‘s intentions have prompted force restructuring and infrastructure 
development at a heightened pace in India, in turn, a reminder of Jervis‘s assertion that 
the security dilemma is intractable, and may only ever be able to be mitigated.  
However, the relationship between India and China cannot be fully explained in 
terms of Jervis‘s formulation of the security dilemma, which presumes that both states are 
status quo powers and the dilemma is an unintended result of their mutual quest for 
security. On the contrary, the Sino-India territorial dispute has the features of a state-
induced security dilemma59, wherein China is consciously maintaining an India-
constraining balance of power by keeping the border dispute alive and by supporting 
Pakistan.60 The reasons it does so appear to be to maintain its hegemony in Asia and 
prevent India from actively supporting the Tibetan cause. Meanwhile, the Sino-Pakistan 
(Pak) nexus has moved the dispute to a regional level, with India as a contender for 
China‘s great power status in Asia. Consequently, the Sino-Pak relationship, China‘s 
growing forays into the IOR, and India‘s Look East Policy are the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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III. GEOPOLITICS AND SINO-INDIA RELATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
―The conflict provoked by Chinese aggression raises wider issues than the simple 
demarcation of a remote border.‖61 These prophetic words from the first Prime Minister 
of India indicate that the dynamics of Sino-India relations are more complex than those 
implied by a simple dyad. In his analysis, Nehru claimed that the conflict was a test of 
which system would prevail in Asia: communist revolutionary China, or democratic non-
aligned India. In saying this, he was echoing the views of the then-Indian Home Minister, 
Sardar Vallabhai Patel. In a letter dated November 7, 1950, Patel cautioned Nehru with 
respect to the ominous fallout from ―the disappearance of Tibet, and the expansion of 
China almost up to our gates.‖62 Patel also raised the possibility of a link-up between 
China and Pakistan, which could put India in a perpetually weak position. The 1962 War 
made Patel‘s realpolitik view representative of mainstream Indian thinking on China. 
Patel‘s views, and those expressed by Nehru in 1963, reveal three distinct issues: the 
logic of geography as dictated by the Himalayas and IOR; the struggle for power, 
security, status, and influence; and, the role of constructed images of oneself and of the 
other. 
Nearly half a century has passed since the armed conflict between India and 
China, but the spatial and ideational context of two disparate giants aspiring to Great 
Power status within the same strategic space has only become more acute. This chapter 
postulates that the geopolitical competition has been, and will continue to be, an enduring 
feature of Sino-India relations in 2020. 
Geopolitics affects Sino-India relations in three distinct ways: efforts to ensure the 
impregnability of the mountain ranges; the development of infrastructure to project 
power over the mountains; and, maneuvers around these geographic barriers. The search 
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for avenues to go around the mountain ranges, and constrain India within the South Asian 
frame, has led China to nurture strong ties with Pakistan, court the military junta of 
Myanmar, and increase its presence in the IOR. China‘s String of Pearls strategy is 
considered by analysts to lead to India‘s strategic encirclement.63 India, for its part, has 
recently started looking beyond its immediate neighborhood; diplomatic concepts such as 
the ‗Look East Policy‘ have an implicit component of soft balancing against China.64 Yet, 
the strategies of India and China are influenced by factors other than their mutual rivalry, 
such as energy security and economics. Many hope that mutual recognition of these 
factors and sensitivity toward each other‘s core issues will keep the competition at a 
pragmatic level. However, through its relations with Pakistan, China has also found a cost 
effective method to balance India without overt action, and is thus likely to continue to 
patronize Pakistan. This is not the kind of costly signal that will reassure India about 
China‘s benign intent or eradicate the security dilemma.       
This chapter begins with a brief discussion about the geographic context within 
which India and China interact. Sino-Pak relations, China‘s overtures in the IOR, and 
India‘s Look East Policy form part of the empirics presented in support of the argument 
that the ―gestalt dominant in Sino-India relations is an image of competition and 
rivalry.‖65  
B. GEOGRAPHY AND INFLUENCE 
The territory stretching from the jungles of northern Myanmar, westward to the 
Karakoram Range, and northward to the edge of the Tibetan plateau can be seen as a 
single geopolitical system referred to as the Himalayan-Tibetan massif: the Tibetan 
plateau extends approximately 800 miles north to south, with heights ranging up to 5,000 
meters, and the Himalayan system extends approximately 300 miles north to south, with 
many peaks over 6,000 meters.66 The ruggedness of this terrain makes movement of men 
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and materiel extremely difficult, thus preventing Indian and Chinese civilizations from 
intermingling or projecting military power in these remote areas effectively. Ancient 
history presents very few incidents of rulers of either India or China attempting to sweep 
across this massif. The Mongol armies of the thirteenth century decided to go around and 
not through Tibet, and, in the seventeenth century, the Dogra rulers of Kashmir sent 
armies into western Tibet, but not beyond it. These facts stand testimony to the ability of 
the Tibet-Himalayan massif to keep the two states separate. Not until 1962 did the 
Chinese and Indian armies fight each other over these desolate heights, thus altering the 
geopolitics of the region significantly.  
The absence of military conflict does not imply that these two ancient 
civilizations did not exercise substantial influence beyond their boundaries. The overlap 
between perceived spheres of influence and the narratives built around notions of national 
greatness add an element of prestige to the Sino-India equation. For instance, an 
exhibition hosted by Indian leaders in 1947 identified Burma, Thailand, Malaya, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Sumatra, Java, and Sri Lanka as regions that received strong 
influences from India in the domains of religion, language, art, and architecture. Similar 
‗soft power‘ influences were also traced in Nepal, Bhutan, and Central Asia; in Tibet, 
Buddhism formed the theme for strong affinity. In contrast, China exercised its influence 
through a tributary system that demanded deference to the Chinese emperor. The 
traditional system included wide portions of Central, South, and Southeast Asia. John 
Garver, in his detailed account of Sino-India relations, graphically displays the overlap in 
the perceived Indian and Chinese spheres of influence.67 He claims that this theme plays 
out today as nationalists in both countries yearn to reestablish their long lost place of 
eminence. 
Take Afro-Asian solidarity. The curtain rises in the 1950s on two newly 
independent countries keen to play a collaborative role. However, soon after the first 
Afro-Asian Conference in 1955 at Bandung, Indonesia, fissures in the Sino-India 
relationship began to surface. For Nehru, the primary goal of the conference was to 
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integrate China into the Asian community and establish strong Sino-India friendship as 
the fulcrum for a rising Asia.68 However, Zhou Enlai expressed resentment of Nehru‘s 
overbearing actions, which he saw as an assertion of India‘s hegemonic mindset.69 Mao 
favored a revolutionary and anti-Western approach in contrast to Nehru‘s notions of non-
alignment, and later called India a puppet of imperialism. The strong views of these 
leaders are relevant since each considered external affairs to be a source of domestic 
legitimacy, and a lever for strengthening their leadership. Given that these events 
happened after India and China had signed the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954, and 
before the exodus of Dalai Lama in 1959, it indicates that the rivalry between the two 
states extended beyond just the boundary issue. From these events forward, India and 
China found themselves on opposite sides of the geopolitical and ideological divide.  It 
was also as early as the Bandung conference that China is reported to have reached a 
strategic understanding with Pakistan based on their convergent interests vis-à-vis India; 
however, it was during the 1960s that this bond blossomed.70  
C. „SINO-PAKISTAN ENTENTE CORDIALE‟71 
Beijing‘s cooperative relations with Pakistan are the most durable element of 
Chinese foreign policy, one that has been described as ‗multidimensional and tested by 
adversity.‘72 An alliance between China and Pakistan threatens India on two fronts. It 
advantages China both in terms of its ambitions in Asia, and serves as an insurance policy 
against any Indian adventurism in Tibet. A strong and stable Pakistan aligned with China 
serves its interests by maintaining a favorable balance of power in Asia; in this lies the 
strategic significance of the Sino-Pak relationship.73 In addition, the feud between India 
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and Pakistan causes the international community to hyphenate India with Pakistan, 
leaving China on a higher plane.74 Beyond the India factor, there are other aspects to the 
legitimate relationship between the two sovereign countries: Pakistan is an important 
destination for Chinese goods, and their bilateral trade is expected to touch $18 billion by 
2015; China watches with concern the U.S. presence in the region, and presents itself as a 
more reliable partner to Pakistan; Pakistan is seen by China as a key to the Muslim world 
and to stability in Xinjiang; and, China also looks to Pakistan as an access route to the 
IOR.75  
Nevertheless, despite these other reasons for close relations, the foundation of this 
otherwise odd alliance between a communist and an Islamic state remains India. From the 
Chinese perspective, an India less hassled by Pakistan might be more assertive against 
China. Moreover, ―to sacrifice Pakistan would be tantamount to conceding South Asia as 
India‘s sphere of influence.‖76 From an Indian perspective, the Sino-Pak relationship is 
sinister because it emboldens Pakistan to maintain its policy of proxy war and nuclear 
saber rattling against India. The contours of the Sino-Pak nexus are detrimental to India‘s 
long term security, and raise questions about China‘s sincerity about improving Sino-
India relations.77 Tellingly, China seems to manage this contradiction through its 
unwillingness to get directly involved in an Indo-Pak armed conflict and by taking a 
neutral approach on Kashmir, thus addressing two of India‘s core concerns.78 To avoid 
the difficult choice during a future Indo-Pak war of either entering the war on Pakistan‘s 
side or letting Pakistan be decisively beaten, China has sought to maintain Pakistan‘s 
conventional and nuclear strength.  In some ways, this policy has been a Chinese 
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masterstroke of constraining India through proxy, without imminent risk to itself, at the 
same time it strives for improved ties and trade with India.79  
1. 1962–1977: The Tale of Two Wars 
The first indication of the budding relationship between China and Pakistan was 
the settlement of their conflicting border claims in March 1963, within three months of 
the Sino-India conflict. The 2,700 square kilometers of territory that Pakistan ceded to 
China is part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which lies at the heart of Indo-Pak 
discord (although China has expressed its readiness to renegotiate the settlement once the 
discord is resolved).80 India‘s defeat in the 1962 War, Pakistan‘s strategic partnership 
with China from 1963, China‘s nuclear test in 1964, Nehru‘s death in 1964, and 
Pakistan‘s perceived military superiority thanks to Patton tanks from the U.S. were the 
main calculations that prompted Pakistan‘s aggression against India in 1965. China cited 
India‘s hegemonic aspirations in South Asia as cause for the aggression, and threatened 
to activate a second front against India.81 Intelligence reports suggested that China 
mobilized adequate troops for a limited offensive, and, given the ebb in Sino-India 
relations at the time, the threats appeared credible. Some analysts claim that cautionary 
warnings from the U.S. prevented China from following through on its threat. 
Nonetheless, by China‘s own account its threats were instrumental in persuading India to 
accept the ceasefire, despite it having had the upper hand in the conflict.82 The USSR 
played a significant role in brokering the actual terms of the ceasefire. The 1965 Indo-Pak 
War was significant in three ways: first, it strengthened Sino-Pak ties. Second, India had 
to learn to survive with a threat of war on two fronts. And third, the conflict highlights 
how the triangular relationship was tied to larger geopolitics of the Cold War era.  
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What had been China‘s neutral policy on Kashmir during the 1950s also soured. 
During and after the 1965 War, China blamed India for imperialism in Kashmir. It 
asserted the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris, lauded Pakistan‘s efforts to 
support the aspirations of the Kashmiri people, and referred to the UN resolution for a 
plebiscite.83 In 1969, Pakistan and China started construction of a land link from Xinjiang 
to Gilgit in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). At a height of 4,877 meters, the 1,300 
kilometer-long Karakoram Highway was the highest paved road in the world, an ominous 
reminder to India of the threat it faced.84  
China‘s military assistance to Pakistan in the years after the 1965 War included 
the arming of two infantry divisions, 500 T-59 tanks, 120 MIG-19 and 300 F-6 fighters, 
and extensive aid to its military industrial base. This was especially important because 
American aid to Pakistan dried up as a reprimand for its use of U.S.-supplied weaponry 
in acting aggressively against India.85 According to the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) database, Chinese exports accounted for nearly 50% of all 
arms transfers to Pakistan during the period 1965 to 1971, a trend that continued into the 
1970s and 1980s.86 China‘s increased military supplies to Pakistan in response to U.S. 
sanctions have been a recurrent feature: in the 1990s China supplied Pakistan with 115 F-
7M fighter aircraft; 250 T-69, 268 T-85 and 113 T-90 tanks; 1000 portable SAMs; 5 fire 
control radars; 15,600 Red Arrow ATGMs; and, when the U.S. suspended the sale of 71 
F-16s after Pakistan‘s nuclear tests in 1998, China announced the joint development of 
JF-17 Thunder fighter planes.87 
Yet interestingly, China‘s stance during the 1971 Indo-Pak War was markedly 
different from its response during 1965. In November 1971, when Pakistani Prime 
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Minister Z.A. Bhutto visited China, it was clear that China was unwilling to get directly 
involved, instead suggesting to Pakistan that it negotiate a settlement with the Awami 
League. However, China continued to provide extensive diplomatic and material support 
to Pakistan, and condemned India for interference in Pakistan‘s internal affairs.88 The 
reasons China changed its stance were manifold: Indian military strength had been 
revamped as evident from the 1965 Indo-Pak War and 1967 skirmish with the Chinese; 
the timing of the war was such that the passes between India and China were closed due 
to snow; the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty had just been concluded, thus altering China‘s 
calculations about the regional balance of power; China was not confident of American 
support despite the U.S. 7th Fleet posturing in the Bay of Bengal to support Pakistan; 
China itself was in the midst of Mao‘s Cultural Revolution; the Bengali struggle held 
shades of a people‘s war, thus China could not denounce it completely - moreover, China 
had probably seen the writing on the wall and did not want to burn bridges with the 
leaders of an emerging nation; finally, China was anxiously awaiting its permanent 
membership to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and could not afford to 
appear to be irresponsible.89 In many senses, then, China‘s disincentives toward military 
confrontation with India in 1971 can be attributed to realist balance of power calculations 
and its assessment of the domestic and international environments, and not to a change of 
heart. However, India‘s role in the liberation of Bangladesh also refreshed China‘s fears 
with respect to Tibetan refugees, and reinforced China‘s faith in the utility of a strong 
Pakistan for restraining India. China‘s military and economic assistance to Pakistan thus 
continued with renewed vigor.  
The 1971 Indo-Pak War had the U.S., China, and USSR posturing precariously to 
guard their geopolitical interests; however, along with Pakistan, India was the only one of 
these nations without nuclear weapons. Between 1965 and 1973, the PRC conducted 14 
nuclear tests, primarily to address its security concerns with respect to the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union. In January 1972, Pakistan made a top secret decision to acquire nuclear 
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weapons; and, in 1974 India conducted its ‗peaceful nuclear test.‘90 Although India 
decided not to pursue a nuclear weapons program, the significance of the event was not 
lost on either China or Pakistan. Pakistan had approached China for assistance in 
developing a nuclear weapon as early as 1972, but active Chinese collusion in 
development of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons can be traced to 1976. China‘s proliferation 
of nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan has since been a major irritant in Sino-India 
relations. 
2. 1978–1998: The Bombs 
Deng Xiaoping stressed the need to demilitarize China‘s foreign relations, and 
expressed interest in a peaceful environment in which China could achieve economic 
development; improvement of Sino-India relations was a part of this strategy. Since then, 
China has deftly managed the contradiction between reaching out to India and providing 
continued assistance to Pakistan through a three pronged strategy: CBMs and increased 
trade with India; a neutral stance on Kashmir; and, nuclear and conventional military aid 
to Pakistan.  
In 1980, Deng announced that the Kashmir conflict was left over from history and 
stressed the need to resolve it peacefully in the spirit of the Simla Agreement. The Simla 
Agreement, which was concluded at the end of the 1971 Indo-Pak War, recognized the 
bilateral nature of the Kashmir conflict and the sanctity of the Line of Control (LOC). 
Support for the Simla Agreement marked a departure from China‘s earlier stand on 
Kashmir that blamed the conflict on Indian expansionism.91 The refusal to either get 
directly involved in an Indo-Pak conflict or internationalize the Kashmir issue has since 
been Beijing‘s official policy towards Indo-Pak relations. China maintained this stance 
even when war clouds thickened over India and Pakistan in 1990, as Pakistan lent support 
to Sikh and Kashmiri militants.92  
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For New Delhi, the litmus test of how sincere China has been about improved 
relations is the role that China has played in developing Pakistan‘s nuclear arsenal. 
―Pakistan is the only case with persuasive evidence that China deliberately assisted a 
foreign country to develop nuclear weapons.‖93 Since 1976, China has provided Pakistan 
with highly enriched uranium, ring magnets, specialized training, and nuclear scientists to 
assist the program.94 In 1983, China is reported to have provided Pakistan with the 
blueprint for the atomic bomb based upon China‘s own nuclear weapons test in 1966 at 
Lop Nor.95 China‘s assistance to Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons program continued through 
the 1980s. In 1992, China signed the NPT, although as John Garver notes, ―after China 
helped Pakistan develop nuclear weapons, then it joined the established nonproliferation 
regime.‖96 While China has observed its legal obligations toward the treaty, it has 
continued its indirect support to Pakistan‘s nuclear program, exemplified by the supply of 
5,000 ring magnets to the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory at Kahuta in 1995.97 In 1992, 
China also agreed to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and 
insisted that its supply of nuclear-capable M-11 missiles to Pakistan was within the 
MTCR‘s provisions. Chinese support then helped Pakistan to move toward domestic 
serial production of solid propellant ballistic missiles. China tried to equate this transfer 
to U.S. technology transfer to Taiwan, since the transfer of M-11s to Pakistan followed 
the U.S. decision to provide F-16s to Taiwan.98 Chinese assistance to Pakistan‘s nuclear 
weapons and missile program was the reason for the U.S. sanctions against China during 
the 1990s. 
The threat posed by China, and its assistance to Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons 
program were among rationales offered by the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in his 
letter addressed to the American president explaining India‘s nuclear tests in 1998. 
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Pakistan‘s nuclear tests within a few days substantiated his claims. China‘s initial 
response to India‘s nuclear tests was measured. However, the leaking of Vajpayee‘s letter 
in Washington invited widespread indignation from Chinese government officials and 
others in the public sphere. In June 1998, the Chinese ambassador to the UN addressed 
the UNSC on the Kashmir issue, and expressed China‘s opposition to regional 
hegemony.99 This was a subtle reminder to New Delhi that Beijing‘s neutral stance on 
Kashmir was not an irreversible proposition.  
3. 1999–2009: Kargil and Beyond 
The role played by status and prestige, in both India‘s and Pakistan‘s decisions to 
develop nuclear weapons, is open to debate. However, the perilous effects of both 
countries‘ nuclear tests were on display during the Kargil conflict in 1999, and the 
military stand-off during 2002. In 1999, the Pakistani military establishment knew it had 
a nuclear deterrent to counter India‘s conventional superiority, and expected to be able to 
draw international attention to the Kashmir conflict as a method of pressuring India.100 
Similar recklessness and nuclear saber rattling could be said to have characterized the 
face-off during 2002 when the Indian Army mobilized in response to a terrorist attack on 
the Indian Parliament by Pakistan-based groups. India‘s resolute action in the face of 
Pakistan‘s defiance, a reprimand by the U.S., and international condemnation in both 
instances unsettled Pakistan‘s calculations. On both occasions, Nawaz Sharif in 1999, and 
Parvez Musharraf in 2002, visited China for support. However, China maintained a 
neutral stance, calling upon both nations to exercise restraint.101 China‘s reference to the 
Simla Agreement, refusal to internationalize the Kashmir conflict, and condemnation of 
terrorism is noteworthy. China‘s stance was also motivated by its own concerns with 
Islamic fundamentalism originating from Pakistan, and the threat of a nuclear exchange 
that could vitiate the environment within which China seeks to achieve its 
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development.102 However, assertions about China‘s all-weather friendship with Pakistan, 
and the material support that goes with it, continued unabated.  
From an Indian perspective, China‘s aversion to direct involvement in an Indo-
Pak War and its neutrality on Kashmir are welcome gestures. However, the nature of 
China‘s military aid to Pakistan remains key to gauging its intent. A vulnerability that 
came to light during the 1999 and 2002 conflicts was Pakistan‘s dependence on the 
Karachi harbor and the ease with which the Indian Navy could blockade it. China‘s 
assistance in the construction of the Gwadar port addresses this key vulnerability, and its 
location at the mouth of the Persian Gulf adds to its geostrategic significance (See Figure 
5). This project reminds us that China will continue to maintain an enduring strategic 
relationship with Pakistan as a low cost/ high pay off venture, albeit without overtly 
encouraging revisionist policies.103  
 
Figure 5.   The Geostrategic Location of the Gwadar Port104 
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4. Gwadar Port 
The Gwadar port was conceived in March 2001, fast tracked after the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan, and operationalized in 2007, ahead of schedule. The project, 
costing approximately $1.16 billion, has been primarily funded by China; China has 
contributed an additional $200 million for the construction of the 653 kilometer-long 
Marakan Coastal Highway, linking Gwadar to Karachi. The port will also be connected 
to the Karakoram Highway through a labyrinth of roads and rail network. Twelve berths 
and terminals with the capacity to handle ships in the 200,000-ton category, along with a 
large special economic zone, make Gwadar one of the largest and most strategically 
located deep-sea ports in the world.105  
Gwadar port is strategically significant for China for numerous reasons. First, the 
project is conceived as a way to diminish India‘s ability to blockade Pakistan during war. 
Second, the port will assist China‘s ability to supply Pakistan. Third, the port will help 
Pakistan emerge as a corridor for trade and transport from the Central Asian Republics 
(CAR) to the outside world. Fourth, the port will help protect China‘s maritime trade 
transiting the Persian Gulf. Fifth, it will provide an energy shunt route to address China‘s 
vulnerabilities in the IOR. Sixth, it will help facilitate the economic development of 
China‘s western regions. Finally, the PLA Navy (PLAN) will also have a new point of 
access to the IOR, and might be able to utilize Gwadar during a military contingency. It is 
important to note that the port has been deepened from 11 to 14 meters, and some reports 
suggest as deep as 19 meters. Analysts point out that a port as deep as 19 meters is only 
useful for carriers and nuclear submarines.106 Presently this is only speculation, but within 
the realm of possibility.    
Gwadar port is an example of China‘s multifaceted relations with Pakistan. While 
balancing against India is a significant part of the calculus, China has its own reasons for 
seeking to ensure stability in Pakistan; it has its own anxieties, particularly with respect to 
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U.S. hegemony in the region. The Gwadar port is one component of what is popularly 
known as China‘s String of Pearls and points toward China‘s ambitions in the IOR.107  
D. CHINA AND THE IOR 
The Indian Ocean links the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans. Strategic bottlenecks 
are found in the form of the Suez Canal (and the Gulf of Aden), the Straits of Hormuz, 
the Cape of Good Hope, and the Straits of Malacca. Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean 
can be explained in terms of China‘s desire to exert influence commensurate to its rising 
might, the security dilemma arising from its dependence on SLOCs transiting the Indian 
Ocean, the threat perceived from a persistent U.S. presence, and India‘s strategic 
location. China‘s Malacca dilemma originates from the fact that nearly 30% of its sea 
trade and 77% of its oil imports flow through the Indian Ocean, making China sensitive 
about the security of its SLOCs through the Straits of Malacca. The 1993 incident, when 
a Chinese freighter, Yin He, was intercepted by the U.S. navy in the international waters 
of the Persian Gulf under a claim that it was transporting chemical weapons to Iran, is 
said to have been a catalyst for Beijing‘s decision to build long-range naval capabilities to 
safeguard its expanding vital interests.108  
In addition to the realist arguments for China‘s naval ambitions, constructivist 
arguments point to China‘s century of humiliation as, in some measure, a result of its 
enemies‘ naval supremacy.109  Similarly, economic development and trade are not seen as 
mere vehicles for increasing national wealth, but the only way for the PRC to maintain its 
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Taiwan and Tibet. However, it recognizes its dependence on SLOCs through the Indian 
Ocean to be an Achilles‘ heel that can be exploited by the US, India, or by both in 
concert.111  
India visualizes the Indian Ocean as its legitimate sphere of influence, and views 
growing Chinese forays in the region as strategic encirclement. Conversely, China is 
wary of Indian assertions, and Zhao Nanqi of the PRC General Staff argues that ―we can 
no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians.‖112 Garver 
characterizes this interaction as an intractable security dilemma, and explains that 
Chinese actions are inspired by security and economic motives. However, he also 
concedes that China is emerging as the anti-status quo power in the IOR. 113 History and 
perceptions make it difficult for either side to be certain of the other‘s intent, thus each 
assesses threats based on tangible capabilities. India has little choice, then, except to 
judge China‘s intentions in the IOR according to the evolution of its naval doctrine, 
development of energy shunt routes, and its quest to establish nodes of influence.   
1. PLAN Doctrine, Modernization, and Diplomacy 
In 1985, PLAN‘s strategic focus shifted from traditional coastal defense to ‗active 
offshore defense‘ and increasingly toward Mahanian concepts of power projection. As 
early as 1988, China was moving toward the vision of a Blue Water navy; in 1997 Jiang 
Zemin exhorted the Navy to build the nation‘s maritime Great Wall based on coastal 
defense and its two chains of islands; and, in 2006, Hu Jintao referred to China as a great 
maritime power. Beijing drew up a three-phase development plan to transform the PLAN 
into a world class sea power by 2040. By 2020, China is expected to complete the second 
phase and acquire the capabilities, even if not the intent, to deploy naval forces in the 
Indian Ocean.114  
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Stealthy underwater assets capable of stand-alone extended missions are the 
mainstay of China‘s sea denial and deterrence strategy. In the period 1995 to 2006, China 
added 36 submarines, including Shang-class Type 093 Nuclear Attack Submarines 
(SSNs), Jin-class Type 094 Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs), and the formidable 
Kilo-class boats. Since 1990, China has inducted nine different destroyer/ frigate designs 
to buttress its surface combatant fleet, to include 051B-Luhai, 051C-Luzhou, 052B-
Luyang, and 052C-Lanzhou class ships. China is also incorporating integrated Air 
Defense (AD) systems similar to the U.S. Aegis phased radar and C-802 anti-ship cruise 
missiles. Also noteworthy is the acquisition of Russian Sovermenny-class destroyers 
designed during the 1970s to counter U.S. carrier groups.115 The rest of China‘s surface 
fleet, consisting of 20 destroyers and 43 frigates, is also being consistently upgraded. 
PLAN is debating the uses of an aircraft carrier; China acquired the Melbourne from 
Australia in 1985, the Soviet Varyag in 1998 and Kiev in 2000, and the Minsk from South 
Korea in 2000 for training and R&D purposes. As per reports, China has ordered the 
domestic construction of at least two carriers that are expected to be operational by 
2020.116 Su-30s and Chinese J-10 multirole fighter aircrafts, supplemented by Il-78 aerial 
tankers, are likely to comprise the backbone of China‘s maritime airpower. It is pertinent 
to mention that China‘s naval plans are primarily focused upon a Taiwan contingency, 
and the perceived threat from the U.S. and Japan in the Pacific. However, naval assets are 
extremely fungible, and with an increase in energy demand, the IOR is steadily being 
incorporated into China‘s security sphere.  
China‘s increasing interest in the IOR is evident from the increase in its naval 
diplomacy in the region. In 1985, PLAN undertook the first naval visit in the Indian 
Ocean, and, significantly, the first port of call was Karachi, followed by Colombo and 
Chittagong. A similar expedition in 1993 included Mumbai, probably to persuade India 
of China‘s benign intentions. In the period 1995–2000, China displayed its reach up to 
and beyond each of the major choke points in the IOR: in 1995 Chinese submarines 
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crossed the Cape of Good Hope, in 1997 a destroyer and frigate called on Malaysia at the 
entrance of the Malacca Straits, and in 2000 a Sovermenny-class destroyer and a 
replenishment tanker sailed from Finland to China through the Suez Canal. Naval 
diplomacy such as this, high profile visits, joint naval exercises, and arms exports to 
Indian Ocean littoral states are now a constant feature of Chinese policy.117 In 2006, 
Beijing hosted the China-Africa summit, extending its reach to the ‗Francophone Western 
IOR‘.118 Even with this outreach, China is likely to be hampered by a mismatch between 
its naval aspirations and capabilities. This is less due to the size and capability of its fleet, 
and more due to the challenge of sustaining these forces across such a vast region. For 
example, without carrier battle groups and overseas bases, the PLA cannot project 
airpower beyond the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits.119 China is also mindful of 
India‘s inherent advantages in the IOR: Beijing has referred to India as an unsinkable 
aircraft carrier dominating the region, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a metal 
chain.120  
2. Energy Shunt Routes and Nodes of Influence 
To overcome these challenges and relieve some of its dependence on the Malacca 
Straits, China intends to build energy shunt routes. This helps explain development of the 
Gwadar port with plans to link it to the Karakoram Highway. The problems are the 
terrain, weather, and the uncertain security situation. In this respect, Myanmar offers a 
better alternative in the form of oil and gas pipelines following the Irrawaddy corridor 
and linking Sittwe/ Kyaukphu with Kunming in China‘s Yunan province. Estimated to 
cost approximately $3 billion, this route would reduce sea travel by 1820 nautical miles 
and could provide for 10% of the oil that currently flows to China through the Malacca 
Straits. For related reasons, China proposed to Thailand a canal across the Kra Isthumus; 
this plan faces questions about its economic viability, but if undertaken would potentially 
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account for another 20% of oil that currently reaches China via the Malacca Straits. Of 
course, these land bridges do not entirely mitigate China‘s strategic vulnerability, since 
the proposed routes aim to bypass the Malacca Straits, but not the Indian Ocean!121  
China‘s desire to project forces in the Indian Ocean and ensure the security of its 
SLOCs has allegedly driven it to pursue the String of Pearls strategy. This term is not a 
Chinese formulation, but a moniker popularized by a 2004 U.S. Department of Defense-
funded report that claimed China is developing a comprehensive network of naval bases 
to include Kra Isthumus in Thailand, Sittwe in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh, 
Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Marao in the Maldives, and Gwadar in Pakistan (See Figure 
6).122 Interestingly, the notion of a String of Pearls swiftly gained an aura of legitimacy in 
India with accompanying fears about India‘s strategic encirclement. Each ‗pearl‘ is 
viewed as a manifestation of Chinese geopolitical influence and its ambition to establish 
its military presence in the IOR.123 
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Figure 6.   String of Pearls124 
Daniel Kostecka, an analyst with the U.S. Department of Navy, has recently 
commented that despite rampant speculation there is little evidence to prove the 
hypothesis that Beijing‘s investments in these locations are designed to serve its military-
strategic ends, and Michael Swaine at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
goes so far as to call the theory a fraud, and highlights the lack of evidence of Chinese 
military involvement.125 Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives have repeatedly 
emphasized the commercial motive of these ventures, and have willingly allowed 
themselves to be courted by India for similar projects: refurbishment of an oil-tank farm 
at Trincomalee, development of Chittagong as a transshipment hub for India‘s North 
East, and defense cooperation with the Maldives.126 Yet, as the 2006 encounter between a 
Chinese Song-class submarine and the USS Kitty Hawk makes clear, there is immense 
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potential for a stand-off in international waters between naval powers competing to 
maintain their perceived strategic spaces. From an Indian perspective, it is hard not to 
view China‘s increased naval presence, energy investments, transit corridors, and ports as 
precursors of a latent threat that needs to be monitored.127 Assertions, such that as by Rear 
Admiral Yin Zhou in 2009 that Beijing must revisit its self-imposed proscription on 
foreign bases, heighten Indian anxiety.128  
3. Sino-India Relations and Myanmar 
One alleged pearl is particularly worrisome due to the ominous prospect of 
replicating the Sino-Pak nexus: Myanmar, a country that lies at the strategic crossroads 
between South West China, North East India, the Indian Ocean, and South East Asia. 
Ties between Mao‘s China and Myanmar were damaged by the support China extended 
to Myanmar‘s communist insurgent groups in the 1960s; and, in 1968, China was 
involved in an undeclared war against Myanmar, which went unnoticed by the 
international community thanks to the Tet Offensive. It was only in 1988/89 that 
Myanmar and China emerged as ‗partners in adversity‘ after they faced criticism and 
sanctions in the wake of their respective crackdowns against democratic protests.129 While 
India opted to politically isolate Myanmar, the PRC took the opportunity to establish a 
foothold in Myanmar. Myanmar offers a threefold advantage to China: one, port access to 
China‘s landlocked and impoverished Yunan Province; two, a transit corridor through 
Myanmar to mitigate China‘s Malacca dilemma; and three, military bases in Myanmar 
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allegedly tied to China‘s long-term two oceans objective and is considered indicative of 
China‘s expansionism.131 Myanmar is also reported to have large gas reserves, a factor 
that is addressed in the next chapter. 
Since 1988, the PRC has made extensive investments in Myanmar. By 2005, this 
included $100 million in aid, $1 billion in sellers‘ credit, and $2 billion invested in 
various projects, thus laying a foundation for strong bilateral relations.132 The main 
infrastructure project undertaken by China has been improvement of the Irrawaddy 
corridor linking Kunming to Kyaukpyu, a deep-water port being developed with Chinese 
assistance. In April 2007, Beijing approved the construction of an oil pipeline linking 
Sittwe to Kunming, in addition to the gas pipeline already underway.133 In 1988, 
Myanmar undertook an ambitious military modernization program with Chinese 
assistance; by 1992, military exports from China amounted to $1.4 billion including a 
squadron of F-7 fighter aircraft, and six Hainan class patrol boats.134  
In 1992, the Kyodo News Agency in Japan reported on a permanent PLA 
presence in Myanmar, which suggested a strategic dimension to the relationship. 
Additional reports alleged that a listening post was established in the Coco islands, barely 
11 miles from India‘s Andaman and Nicobar Islands, along with a naval base at Haingyyi 
Island.135 Over time these reports, often from anonymous sources, were widely accepted 
as established facts, and proof of China‘s efforts to gain access to Myanmar‘s military 
facilities. It only took a short leap to then assert that these were in fact Chinese naval 
bases. The 1994 capture of three Myanmarese fishing trawlers in the Indian Ocean with 
55 Chinese personnel onboard, as well as radio and depth sounding apparatus but no 
fishing equipment further fuelled suspicion. So did the 1997 treaty between Myanmar 
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and China, granting the latter a 30-year permit to fish in Myanmar‘s waters.136 The fact 
that the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and PRC were two of the 
most opaque regimes in the world did not help allay suspicions.  
 
Figure 7.   The ‗Chinese Corridor‘ Through Myanmar137 
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Amidst reports of increased Chinese involvement in Myanmar, India started to 
fear the effects of a Chinese client state on its Eastern flank; when viewed in conjunction 
with China‘s partnership with Pakistan, the prospects for India‘s national security 
appeared alarming. This perceived threat prompted the Indian government to take a 
realist U-turn with respect to relations with Myanmar. The Indian approach, though it 
suffers from vacillations due to internal differences regarding Myanmar‘s domestic 
politics, is somewhat similar to that of the Chinese. India aspires to connect its 
landlocked and insurgency-ridden North East to the Myanmar port of Sittwe through the 
Kaladan Project, which includes the construction of a new harbor at Sittwe. In 2002, 
India proposed to extend this multi-nodal transport project to Thailand.138 In 2004, New 
Delhi proposed a railway link to Hanoi, thus further reinforcing Myanmar‘s position as 
the land bridge linking India to South East Asia. In addition to these ambitious 
infrastructure projects, India is also involved in establishing an IT park, two e-learning 
centers, and an e-government project in Myanmar.139 The commencement of border trade 
at Moreh and Pangsau, construction of the Indo-Myanmar Friendship Road, and plans to 
upgrade the Stillwell road are other important initiatives. The first Indo-Myanmar joint 
naval exercise was conducted in 2003, heralding defense cooperation, albeit on a modest 
scale.140  
Sino-Myanmar relations exemplify how the perception of a threat is enough to 
create the threat itself. Myanmar has a Coco Islands naval facility that almost certainly 
plays an intelligence function as well, and Haingyyi has been Myanmar‘s regional naval 
command center since 1992. It is possible that Chinese assistance may have been utilized 
to upgrade these locations. However, even after years of speculation, analysts have found 
no concrete evidence of a permanent Chinese military presence in Myanmar.141 In 2005,  
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India acknowledged that there was no Chinese base at Coco Islands, or anywhere else in 
Myanmar, and in 2008 Myanmar passed a referendum prohibiting foreign troops from 
being based on its soil.142 
Indeed, one might go so far as to say that xenophobia prevents Myanmar from 
being a hapless pawn in the hands of the Chinese. If anything, the junta has been deftly 
hedging between India and China to its own advantage.143   
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Figure 8.   The ―Indian Corridor‖ Through Myanmar144 
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This assessment of Myanmar may be applicable to other places in the region as 
the quiet rivalry between India and China continues to ferment. In the IOR, Chinese 
actions appear to be motivated by economics and its own security concerns; the 
possibility of encircling India ―is the plus of Beijing‘s strategy, but not its core 
dimension.‖145 It is also instructive that over the past two decades there have been no 
hostile encounters between India and China in Myanmar, while both continue to invest in 
different plans, and to differing extents. The smaller countries in the region can be 
expected to continue to hedge, rather than to overtly balance or bandwagon with either 
India or China.  
From an Indian standpoint, even if no material evidence exists about any single 
pearl, cumulatively Chinese actions are suggestive of its long-term strategic ambitions.146 
At the same time, the idea of the String of Pearls and suspicions about Myanmar in 
particular also caution against cognitive traps when assessing the threat posed by China. 
The propensity to amplify China‘s capabilities, ascribing sinister intentions and 
overestimating one‘s own status as an adversary, can lead to otherwise preventable 
trouble. The quest for a fine balance between guarding one‘s own interests and not 
fuelling the rivalry will be a constant feature as India and China head toward 2020.  
E. INDIA LOOKS EAST 
In 1991, India faced a number of strategic and economic challenges that 
threatened its survival. The end of the Cold War presented an opportunity whereby India 
and the states of South East Asia were no longer enmeshed on the opposite sides of a 
bipolar international structure. Sensing the altered geopolitics, then-Indian Prime 
Minister Narsimha Rao launched a multipronged ‗Look East Policy‘ to achieve greater 
economic and political alignment with the dynamic Asia Pacific region.147 This policy 
was operationalized through institutional linkages with ASEAN, and the strengthening of 
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bilateral ties with individual countries. It is important to highlight the economy, and the 
yearning to develop India‘s North East, as prime motivators for this policy initiative. 
ASEAN countries were equally motivated by the opportunities presented by India‘s 
economic liberalization. Because the end of the Cold War had changed the balance of 
power in the region decidedly in China‘s favor, the ASEAN countries welcomed India as 
a possible counter-balance to China‘s growing assertiveness.148 Balance of power 
calculations were thus inherent in India‘s admission to ASEAN in 1992 as a sectoral 
dialogue partner in the fields of trade, investment, tourism, and science and technology.149 
Despite official denials by both India and ASEAN, soft balancing against China has been 
a significant tenet of the burgeoning relationship between India and ASEAN.  
1. Regional and Sub Regional Organizations 
In 1995, India was elevated to the status of a full dialogue partner of ASEAN, and 
admitted as a member of the ARF the following year. It is significant that after 50 years 
of independence, ARF was the first multilateral security organization India chose to 
join.150 India‘s growing interaction with ASEAN came at a time when regional states 
were increasingly wary of Chinese intentions in view of the Mischief Reef incident of 
1995, the Taiwan crisis of 1996, and the dispute over the Spratly islands; hence, some 
analysts attribute ASEAN‘s muted response to India‘s nuclear tests in 1998 to their 
willingness to accommodate the sole Asian power capable of balancing China in the 
future.151 
Trade between India and ASEAN countries has increased from a meager $3.5 
billion in 1991, to more than $39 billion in 2008.152 While the $160 billion trade between 
China and ASEAN countries is much stronger, India has leverage in the field of 
information technology (IT). Also, the fact it has no territorial disputes and no adverse 
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historical baggage with the ASEAN countries grants it certain advantages over China.153 
At the turn of the century, India was ready to enter Phase 2 of its Look East Policy with 
the India-ASEAN Business Summit in 2002, and the declaration to establish a Free Trade 
Area (FTA) by 2016; coming two years after a similar declaration by China, the race to 
establish FTAs has been viewed by some analysts as another example of Sino-India 
rivalry.154  
The inclusion of India in the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005, despite China‘s 
objections, marked a significant step toward strengthening India‘s ties with ASEAN. 
China deftly applied its influence to create two blocs within EAS: the core group limited 
to the ASEAN (+3), and a second group including all peripheral members.155 China also 
used Pakistan‘s good offices to gain observer status in the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), much to India‘s chagrin; India, in turn, facilitated the 
granting of similar status to the U.S. and Japan, thus negating the effect of China‘s 
enterprise.156 The inclusion of India, Australia, and New Zealand in the EAS is said to 
have breathed new life into the East Asian security architecture, but from China‘s 
perspective would have to be considered an unwelcome intrusion. 
In addition to engaging with the ASEAN countries, India has also pursued 
cooperation through sub-regional organizations, challenging China‘s position as the 
epicenter of such initiatives. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical 
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) was launched in 1997 under India‘s aegis, as a 
bridge to bring together select countries from SAARC and ASEAN, thus highlighting 
natural congruence between the two.157 In 2000, India launched the Mekong Ganga 
Cooperation (MGC) focused upon tourism, culture, and education; conspicuous by its 
absence was China, a major Mekong state. Indian proposals to build a road to Thailand 
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and rail link to Hanoi are widely viewed as counters to similar proposals by China. 158 
However, India‘s relative economic and institutional weakness means that it is far from 
able to translate economic engagement into strategic influence.  
2. Bilateral Relations 
Singapore has emerged as India‘s most important bilateral partner in the region, 
and has been instrumental in elevating India‘s status within ASEAN.159 Singapore is the 
third largest foreign investor in India, and, with the signing of the Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation Agreement in 2005, both countries have eliminated most customs 
duties on bilateral trade.160 Singapore and India have been actively involved in defense 
cooperation since 1994, which was further solidified with the signing of the 2003 
Defense Cooperation Agreement. While Singapore utilizes Indian military training 
facilities at Deolali, Babina, Chandipur, and Kochy, India has been allowed access and 
logistics rights at the Changi Naval Base at the tip of the Malacca Straits.161 Singapore is 
an example of a regional state willing to engage India and avoid overdependence on 
China, with the encouragement of the U.S.162   
In January 2000, then-Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes described 
Vietnam as India‘s most trusted friend and ally. Shared concerns over Chinese 
hegemony, memories of past aggression, and fears of future intentions provide a strong 
foundation for a relationship marked by growing defense and economic ties. The 
establishment of a strategic partnership in 2003 is likely to overcome India‘s current 
political caution about supplying Prithvi and Brahmos missiles to Vietnam under the 
provisions of the MTCR.163 These supplies will boost Vietnam‘s military potential in the 
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South China Sea. However, Vietnam‘s hesitation, or even unwillingness, to allow Indian 
Navy berthing rights at the Cam Ranh Bay deep port ―reflects the centuries old pendulum 
between obeisance and outright hostility‖ toward China.164 China has responded in its 
characteristic fashion: Chinese investment in Vietnam has increased from $7.2 million in 
1995 to $85.6 million in 2004, totaling $200 million during this period.165 Vietnam is an 
example of how countries in the region may seek maximum maneuverability by hedging, 
not aligning, and by thereby avoiding domination by any single major power.166  
As India entered the second phase of its Look East Policy, the very notion of the 
East was being redefined as India began to reach out to Japan. The deterioration of 
relations between Japan and the PRC signaled that Tokyo might be ready to set aside its 
aversion to India‘s nuclear tests, paving the way to high-level visits and military ties. The 
‗arc of democracy‘ comprised of India, Japan, and Australia, has been viewed by China 
as evidence of India‘s involvement in a containment strategy engineered by the U.S.167 
3. Naval Diplomacy 
The Indian Maritime Doctrine 2004 identifies South East Asia as part of India‘s 
extended neighborhood and an area of legitimate interest.168 India has thus employed 
naval diplomacy to foster cooperative frameworks with the littoral states of South East 
Asia in an effort to establish a regular naval presence in the region without overtly 
confronting the Chinese. Joint exercises with Indonesia, Vietnam, and Singapore in the 
South China Sea signal India‘s ability to impinge on China‘s traditional maritime space. 
MALABAR 2007 with the U.S., Japan, and Australia in the Bay of Bengal; TRILATEX 
2007 with the U.S. and Japan off the western coast of Japan and the East China Sea; 
SIMBEX 2009 with Singapore in the South China Sea; observer status in the RIMPAC  
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exercises off Hawaii; and, participation in exercises with the U.S. Navy between 
Okinawa and Guam mark a discernible trend169: India appears to be joining the chorus 
that the South China Sea is not a Chinese lake!170       
In the final analysis, while India‘s Look East Policy is primarily motivated by 
economics, soft balancing against China is also taking place. The South East Asian 
countries are key players in this interaction, and are likely to continue the current practice 
of hedging against both India and China; in fact, it is India and China that will compete 
for ASEAN‘s favors, ranging from tangible trade benefits to intangible influence.171 India 
has shown a newfound readiness to engage in multifaceted relationships marked by 
defense diplomacy, and is likely to further shed its aversion to regional multilateralism.172   
Neo-liberals like Robert Keohane claim that repeated interaction between states in 
multilateral institutions propels them toward greater cooperation and contributes to 
complex interdependence.173 Some of the positive benefits of such interaction are evident 
in China‘s relations with ASEAN: China is more willing to put off a final resolution of 
the Spratly islands dispute, and views multilateralism as a better way to expand its 
influence in the face of America‘s overwhelming force.174 Similarly, the interaction 
between India and China in multilateral forums can potentially lead to enhanced mutual 
understanding and consensus building. However, China‘s opposition to India‘s inclusion 
in the EAS is an indicator that the positive effects of institutionalization are not 
guaranteed in a competitive environment. Up to this point, China has been able to avoid 
taking a lone position on India‘s bid to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation  
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(APEC) and the UNSC, thanks to America‘s ambivalence; however, with time, if U.S. 
objections abate China‘s stance stand will be more obvious, and reveal its actual strategic 
orientation towards India.175     
Significantly, the growing dialogue between India and the U.S. can either 
undermine the process of Sino-India normalization or accelerate it by encouraging the 
Chinese leadership to try to wean New Delhi away from Washington‘s influence.176 The 
willingness on the part of the Chinese to make some concessions can be sensed through 
the signing of the India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and 
Prosperity in 2005 and the Strategic Vision for the 21
st
 Century in 2008.177 Theoretically, 
India can itself emerge as a swing state by showing some of the same adroitness 
displayed by smaller countries in the region. However, in the face of persistent core 
differences, China is likely to continue to be considered a potential threat. India and the 
U.S., by virtue of their shared values and security concerns, can be expected to further 
strengthen their bilateral relations.  In such a scenario, whether partnership with the U.S. 
adds stability (through a balance of power) or instability (by stoking a security dilemma) 
remains to be seen, and is something New Delhi will have to appraise constantly.   
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analyzed Sino-India relations from a geopolitical point of view. 
By concentrating on each country‘s sphere of influence, through the lenses of Sino-Pak 
relations, China‘s forays in the IOR, and India‘s Look East policy, one gets the sense that 
a quiet rivalry for power, security, wealth, and status is underway.  
Analyzing the trend in Sino-Pak relations yields a mixed report card: a neutral 
stance on Kashmir and unwillingness to get directly involved in an Indo-Pak conflict are 
welcome signs, but continued conventional and nuclear assistance to Pakistan‘s military 
to constrain India will cast a shadow on future prospects for good Sino-India relations. 
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For the sake of its own economic prosperity and stability in Xinjiang, one might hope that 
China would encourage stability in Pakistan. One of the greatest challenges in coming 
years for Indian policy makers will be to estimate China‘s future intentions with respect 
to India, and the contours of Sino-Pak relations will be the most important indicator for 
gauging that.    
China‘s overtures in the IOR are primarily motivated by its security concerns with 
respect to its SLOCs, and the desire to fuel economic growth in Xinjiang and Yunan. The 
military value of a String of Pearls approach cannot be determined from the available 
evidence, so any analysis is presumptuous. However, China‘s desire to be recognized as a 
global power implies that its drive towards a Blue Water Navy will intensify in the future, 
and will look menacing to India. 
India‘s Look East Policy is inspired by economics, but the implicit aspect of soft 
balancing against China is hard to miss. U.S. hegemony will be a critical factor in 
maintaining the delicate balance of power in the region, especially since traditional 
boundaries between South, South East, and East Asia are being blurred through regional 
institutions. China‘s attitude toward India‘s quest to join APEC, and the UNSC will be 
critical for their bilateral relationship.  
It is significant that despite the obvious competition between India and China 
there have been no hostile encounters between them, even when they are vying for 
influence or economic advantage in the same region or country. This positive observation 
must be attributed to the pragmatic approach taken by both countries, and the critical role 
played by the smaller states in the region. On the one hand, they stand to benefit from the 
doting gaze of both India and China; on the other hand, they are well positioned to 
continue to hedge against domination by either.     
From the perspective of IR theories, the analysis in this chapter has to be 
considered biased since geopolitics best fits with the frameworks offered by offensive 
realism and balance of power constraints. But, the security dilemma espoused by 
defensive realists, and the role of national and regional interests, are also relevant. So is 
the liberal explanation with respect to the role of institutions, which is partially validated 
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by the manner in which China is getting socialized within ASEAN (+3). Of course, a 
positive impact on Sino-India relations still awaits future judgment. The paramount 
concern in this chapter has been to investigate the politico-strategic rivalry between India 
and China, which cannot be considered without taking into account frenzied trade and 






IV. RISING CHINA AND EMERGING INDIA 
A. “IT‟S THE ECONOMY, AND NO ONE‟S STUPID”178  
The GDP of China and India in 1947 was $239 billion and $222 billion 
respectively.179 It was not until 1978 for China and 1991 for India that the two countries 
were ready to break the proverbial shackles of the past and set forth on a journey of 
economic liberalization. Beginning with Deng‘s proclamation of the Four 
Modernizations, China steadily established itself as the world‘s assembly factory. In 
contrast, India became the first developing country whose export take-off was based on 
services rather than manufacturing. China‘s economic liberalization was paradoxically 
orchestrated by the Communist Party, whereas a vibrant private sector took the lead in 
India. A look at the growth in GDP for both countries, and projections for the future tell 
us an impressive tale in respect to China. India‘s achievements, though dwarfed in 
comparison to China‘s progress, are significant in their own right. China and India are the 
second and fourth largest economies of the world as per their purchasing power parity 
(PPP), and, as per current estimates, the two countries are expected to grow at 10% and 
8% respectively in the short to medium term.  
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Figure 9.   Observed and Projected GDP Growth of China and India in U.S. Dollars 
(Trillions)180 
We can trace some of this success back to Rajiv Gandhi‘s visit to Beijing in 1988 
in the wake of the military standoff in Arunachal Pradesh. One of the major achievements 
of that trip was the commitment of the two countries to uncouple the boundary issue from 
economic ties: during the visit, three agreements were signed to further economic 
cooperation, which laid the bedrock for future interactions.181 These measures served as a 
valuable CBM. In 1992, the two countries opened consulates in Mumbai and Shanghai. 
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Bilateral trade, from a modest $123 million in 1987 steadily increased to $1 billion in 
1995.182 It can be argued that economic interactions between China and India became 
significant only at the turn of the current century, but within a decade have assumed a 
dynamic of their own with the potential to radically change Sino-India relations. This 
chapter strives to explore the nature of economic progress in China and India, their 
bilateral economic interactions, and the impact these are likely to have on the prospects 
of Sino-India relations by 2020.  
The two major schools of IR theory predict diametrically opposite effects of 
economic progress on Sino-India relations. Realists assume that the high politics of 
military security dominate the low politics of economic affairs. Armed with Robert 
Gilpin‘s assumption that a state‘s interest in relative gains will lead to aggressive 
economic behavior, analysts suggest that two rising powers that share a troubled past, 
rapidly growing economies, and global ambitions cannot peacefully co-exist at such close 
quarters.183 These analysts view the prospects of Sino-India relations in terms of energy 
competition, trade wars, and the military security dilemma. In contrast, liberals dating 
back to Montesquieu, assert that the natural effect of commerce is to bring about peace.184 
Analysts who subscribe to this latter school generate three hypotheses: one, economic 
interdependence will raise the opportunity costs of conflict and promote peace; two, 
private actors will develop stakes in a mutually beneficial relationship and domestic 
influence will shift from military conservatives to business elites; and three, the 
imperative to maintain their reputation as responsible partners in the global economic 
system will move both members of the dyad towards negotiated settlement.185 Indeed, as 
Jonathan Holslag contends, negative images of the past may erode when relations have 
been sustained for a long period. This reinforces the constructivist argument that through 
mutually beneficial relations, societies will reconstruct their identities through one 
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another‘s lenses.186 However, empirical evidence with respect to Sino-India economic 
interactions does not neatly fit them into either of these IR paradigms. Hence, one can 
only use analytic eclecticism to transcend the boundaries between what current IR 
theories offer. Because Sino-India economic interactions have only gained significance 
over the last decade, any analysis is tentative. Bearing that in mind, this chapter aims to 
assess discernible trends and how they may play out in the future.   
The argument presented in this chapter is that economics is likely to add 
pragmatism to Sino-India relations in four ways. Firstly, the economic focus in both 
countries will impel them to maintain a peaceful environment in which to achieve their 
development goals, and this orientation will be beneficial to their relationship. Secondly, 
economic progress is likely to provide both militaries with additional resources for 
modernization. The anticipated costs of war will have a sobering impact on Sino-India 
relations; however, the pace of China‘s military modernization will reinforce the 
relevance of deterrence in the minds of Indian policy makers. Thirdly, China‘s and 
India‘s economic development will increase their dependence on imported energy 
resources. The quest to gain preferential access to oil and gas is likely to lead to 
competition between the two, but both countries will also continue to explore avenues 
that can transform their mutual vulnerability into an area of cooperation. Lastly, the 
burgeoning trade between China and India will create a constituency for peace. Even so, 
bilateral trade by itself may not be sufficient to establish complex interdependence; the 
impetus for that will have to come from the process of political rapprochement.          
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part reviews China‘s 
proclamations of its peaceful rise and military modernization. Although a detailed 
comparison between the Chinese and Indian militaries is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
issues relating to China‘s defense budget, doctrines, and capabilities are addressed. Next, 
the chapter analyzes China‘s and India‘s quests to gain energy resources and the effect of 
this pursuit on their relationship. Finally, the chapter assesses Sino-India economic 
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interactions with an emphasis on institutional mechanisms and bilateral trade, leaving to 
the Conclusion questions regarding the prospects for complex interdependence. 
 B. CHINA‟S PEACEFUL RISE AND MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
1. Peaceful Rise 
The ascendance of Deng Xiaoping onto the national stage and the downfall of the 
Gang of Four replaced the bellicosity of Mao‘s revolution with declarations of peace and 
development. In 1978, Deng announced the Four Modernizations and further departed 
from the legacy of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. In 1988, while 
receiving Rajiv Gandhi in Beijing, Deng categorically emphasized the economic focus of 
his policies: ―we have wasted about 20 years when we could have been building our 
country.‖187 Based on the principle of ‗Tao Guang Yang Hui‘ (Hide Brightness, Nourish 
Obscurity), China declared that it would no longer support insurgencies in India‘s 
northeastern states.188  
Since the middle of the 1990s, and in the aftermath of the Taiwan Straits crisis, 
China began to justify its rapid economic and military development in terms of a new 
security concept: ―the core of the new security concept should be mutual trust, mutual 
benefit, equality, and cooperation.‖189 Repeated references were made to the United 
Nations charter, world peace, and security. Analysts infer that this orientation was 
inspired by two long-term motivations: one, the need to focus on critical economic, 
political, and social challenges at home; and two, the need to diffuse concerns and 
distrust amongst regional players. In 2003, this orientation was christened the peaceful 
rise, and in 2004, Wen Jiabao stressed the need to take advantage of world peace to 
promote China‘s economic growth. When a few critics started questioning the linkage  
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between peaceful and rise, China‘s leaders adopted peaceful development as its new 
mantra. The PRC appears to have made a conscious decision to avoid military 
entanglements as it instead focuses on maximizing its CNP.190  
Despite rising GDPs and high growth rates, both China and India still have 
significant poverty, very low per capita income, and pockets of domestic unrest. The 
leaders in both countries recognize that rising inequalities may result in social tensions: 
the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party hinges on the success of its economic 
model, and even the Indian Prime Minister acknowledges that Indian Maoists are India‘s 
greatest internal security challenge. Thus, the quest for economic progress is not just a 
reflection of each country‘s aspiration to great power status, but has an important 
domestic political rationale. Moreover, the economic strategies of both China and India 
rely on exports and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), and neither is keen to disturb the 
investment climate for their economic suitors.191 This emphasis on economics is likely to 
have a continued favorable impact on their bilateral relationship.  
Those who think in terms of strategic culture argue that China considers 
territorial disputes to be of high value; they argue China is more likely to use force, as 
opposed to accommodation, to guard its interests192: ―The [ancient Chinese] texts reflect 
essentially a parabellum conceptualization of the security problematique. Consistent with 
this paradigm most of the texts show a preference for violent strategies over 
accommodation.‖193 However, belying this view, China has, since the 1980s, resolved 
most of its border disputes, making important concessions. In an article examining 
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of strategic culture theory, concludes that China is integrating more with global 
governance structures, is emerging as a beneficiary of the system, and does not show an 
indication of challenging the current world order.194  
However, three objections come to mind: China may be doing this to prevent 
balancing behavior among neighboring states in collusion with the U.S.; two, China has 
not resolved its border dispute with India, or abstained from constraining India by arming 
Pakistan; and three, this might be a transitory strategy that enables China to maximize its 
CNP. In other words, it is unclear whether this heralds a permanent evolution.  
Various estimates predict that China‘s CNP will be comparable to that of the U.S. 
by the middle of the century. No one can be sure what shape China‘s foreign policy will 
take then.195 However, in the meantime, China is likely to seek a peaceful environment 
guided by self-interest. This will benefit both China and India, and create the temporal 
space in which they might be able to resolve differences, build positive relations through 
CBMs, and continue to evaluate each other‘s intentions. A key instrument for evaluating 
China‘s future intentions, at least from India‘s point of view, is via an analysis of its 
military modernization. 
2. China‟s Military Modernization 
Military modernization was the last among the four modernizations announced by 
Deng Xiaoping. However, the implicit connection between economic progress and 
military modernization, and their combined contribution toward China‘s CNP was 
evident. David Shambaugh identifies the threat of Taiwan‘s independence, U.S. 
hegemony in Asia, China‘s desire to be a global power, growing energy demands, and the 
regional security environment as the contextual drivers of China‘s military 
modernization. Within the regional context, China appears more anxious with respect to 
its relations with Japan and a contingency arising in the Korean peninsula than with 
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planning for an eventuality against India.196 However, the Chengdu and Lanzhou Military 
Regions (MR) take India into account as a potential adversary.197  
According to Jonathan Holslag, the overall balance of power between China and 
India differs across various dimensions of military capability, but on the whole they are 
both vulnerable to potential acts of hostility (See Table 1). He affirms that multiple levels 
of deterrence lead to the reduced probability of an armed conflict.198  
 
Manpower/ Weapon systems China India 
Manpower 2.1 Million 1.3 Million 
Tanks/ APCs/LAVs/Artillery/ 30,010 16,336 
Combat aircraft 2554 599 
Surface Combatants 75 48 
Submarines 60 16 
Nuclear Warheads 410 70-110 
Table 1.   Manpower and Weapon Systems of China and India199 
Clearly, the GDP growth in China and India has direct relevance to their defense 
expenditures. The defense burden of the Chinese military, described as a percentage of 
GDP and total government expenditure, has remained modest at below 2% and 10% 
respectively. However, the current rate of GDP growth implies that, in absolute terms, the 
Chinese military will have adequate monetary resources for its planned modernization.200 
SIPRI data confirms that Chinese military expenditures have grown at an unmatched rate 
during the 21
st
 century (See Figure 10). Moreover, agencies such as the International 
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Institute of Strategic Studies estimate that China‘s actual defense spending is between 
two to three times the official figures.201 India has been spending approximately 2.5% of 
its GDP on defense, and the rise in India‘s GDP has implied a similar loosening of purse 
strings for military modernization.  
 
Figure 10.   Military Expenditure Increase 2000–2009202 
Assuming China and India continue to spend 2% and 2.5% of their projected 
GDPs on defense, and that these funds will be translated into vital military assets, the 
difference in their respective capabilities will start widening in the time frame of 2020 
(See Figure 11). The lack of transparency with respect to China‘s military expenditure or 
its future intentions will further add to India‘s apprehensiveness.  
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Figure 11.   Observed and Predicted Defense Expenditures (in $ billions) of China and 
India203 
The PLA doctrine has evolved through five stages: People‘s War (1935-1979), 
People‘s War Under Modern Conditions (1979-1985), Limited War (1985-1991), 
Limited War Under High Technology Conditions (1991-2004), and Limited War Under 
High Technology and Information Conditions (since 2005).204 The revision in 1985 was 
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based on Deng‘s assessment that China no longer faced a threat of a superpower 
invasion, but did not rule out regional confrontations. The last two evolutions have been 
motivated by China‘s study of the two Iraq Wars and the Revolution in Military Affairs, 
especially with regard to a Taiwan contingency against the U.S. Currently, the Chinese 
military emphasizes Precision Guided Missiles, automating Command, Control, 
Communications, and Information (C3I) systems, Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities, 
integrated joint operations, and the need to enhance logistics support and maintenance.205 
Despite the inflow of money, the fact that China has a nascent defense industrial complex 
and lacks access to western armaments technology is likely to impede its military 
modernization.    
China‘s 2006 White Paper on Defense lays out a three step development strategy 
for military modernization and sets 2020 as a milestone in several fields.206 Modernization 
to support the latest doctrine has not occurred across the board, but has centered on 
developing pockets of excellence within the Air Force, Navy, and China‘s 2nd Artillery. 
Within the ground forces, the emphasis has been on rapid response units capable of 
deploying anywhere in China within 24 hours. Four Group Armies (GA) have reportedly 
been trained for such contingencies, with the 13
th
 GA (Chengdu MR) specifically trained 
for high altitude warfare.207 China‘s conventional missile forces include approximately 
1500 Short/ Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs/ MRBMs) deployed on its 
Eastern seaboard; worth noting is that a portion of these missiles could be easily 
redeployed against India.208  
The PLA cannot transform itself into a modern military capable of challenging 
U.S. hegemony in Asia over the next decade; moreover, it has exhibited little evidence of 
attempting to acquire disproportionate power projection capabilities that would imply an 
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aggressive intent. However, the PLA‘s regional reach will steadily improve and alter the 
balance of power in Asia.209 The frantic pace of infrastructure development in Tibet is, for 
instance, a cause of concern for India since it has shrunk the preparatory period for 
responding to a High Level Threat (HLT) from six months to a matter of a few weeks.210 
Indian moves to revamp airfields in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, forward deployment 
of Su-30 squadrons, and the decision to upgrade strategic roads in India‘s North-East 
suggest that although an arms race between China and India is neither prudent nor 
expected, India will be hard pressed to ensure it has a sufficient credible conventional and 
nuclear deterrence capability to prevent any miscalculations of cheap victory or 
opportunism. This counter-balancing might partially feed the security dilemma. However, 
the advantages that accrue to a mountain defense and nuclear deterrence imply that India 
can wisely choose to maintain the offense-defense balance recommended by Robert 
Jervis as a means to mitigate the security dilemma.211  
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Service/ Capability China India 
Ground Forces Airborne 
- 1 Corps. 
- 2 Naval Infantry Brigades. 
Helicopters 
- 30 Attack and 10 Assault. 
Airborne 
- 5 Battalions 
Helicopters 
- 20 Attack and 12 Assault. 
Air Force Advanced Fighters  
- 115 Su-27 (J-11). 
- 75 Su-30 MKK. 
- 60 J-10. 
Air Transport 
- 18 IL-76 MD. 
- 30 IL-76 TD. 
Air Refueling 
- 10 HY-6. 
- 8 IL-78 on order. 
Advanced Fighters  
- 100 MiG 27 ML. 
- 50 Su-30 MKI. 
- 35 Mirage 2000. 
- 50 Mig 29B. 
Air Transport 
- 25 IL-76 Candid. 
Air Refueling 
- 6 IL-78 Midas. 
Navy - 60 Submarines (7 Nuclear). 
- 1 Aircraft Carrier Varyag  
(Not commissioned). 
- 75 Small Landing Ships. 
- 160 Landing Crafts. 
- 16 Submarines. 
- 1 Aircraft Carrier. 
- 1 Large Landing Ship. 
- 10 Small Landing Ships. 
- 6 Landing Crafts. 
Missiles - 35 IRBM. 
- 1500 MRBM/ SRBM. 
- 12 IRBM. 
- 30 SRBM. 
Satellites - 43 (13 Military). - 16 (1 Military). 
Table 2.   Relative Power Projection Capabilities of China and India212 
China‘s anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test in 2007, its anti-ship ballistic missile 
(ASBM) test in 2010, and the maiden flight of a J-20 fifth generation stealth fighter 
aircraft in 2011 represent signaling by the PLA, presumably designed to convince the 
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U.S. to respect China‘s intentions regarding Taiwan.213 The effectiveness of some of these 
weapon systems is questionable, and most of these prototypes will take considerable time 
before they become operational. However, the PLA‘s desire to leapfrog the technological 
divide is unmistakable. China‘s aspiration to match, or at least deter, U.S. forces during a 
future Taiwan crisis, sets such a high technological benchmark for the PLA that this 
might automatically grant it an edge against India. Thus, while striving for a semblance 
of parity in numbers, India should probably review the qualitative effectiveness of its 
deterrence capabilities frequently.   
In contrast to its ever-evolving conventional doctrines, China‘s nuclear doctrine 
has been relatively consistent.  China‘s leaders have viewed nuclear weapons as tools for 
deterring nuclear aggression and resisting nuclear coercion, and not as weapons to 
accomplish military objectives.214 The tenets of minimum credible deterrence, no first 
use, and civilian control imply that there is a striking similarity between both China‘s and 
India‘s stated nuclear doctrines.215 As Manpreet Sethi comments, the defensive 
orientation of China‘s and India‘s nuclear doctrines enhance stability, and consequently 
the relationship should be less prone to deterrence breakdown.216  
Nonetheless, in 2010, China is reported to have deployed a credible second-strike 
capability for assured retaliation against all its nuclear adversaries, and the current 
emphasis continues to be to improve the reliability, survivability, and penetrability of its 
nuclear arsenal through mobility, concealment, and a moderate increase in warheads. 
Toward this end, China has started deploying road mobile and solid fuelled DF-31 and 
DF-31A Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and is reportedly building five Jin-
class SSBNs, which would be armed with approximately 10 JL-2 Submarine Launched 
                                                 
213 Shirley Kan, China's Anti Satellite Weapon Test (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, [2007]); Ronald O' Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities - 
Background and Issues for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, [2011]); Taiming 
Cheung, The J-20 Fighter Aircraft and the State of China's Defense Science, Technology, and Innovation 
Potential Study of Innovation and Technology in China, [2011]).  
214 Fravel and Medeiros, China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear 
Strategy and Force Structure, 51. 
215 Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear Deterrence in Second Tier Nuclear Weapons States: A Case Study of 
India (New Delhi: CSH [2009]). 
216 Ibid. 
 73 
Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).217 Future trends suggest that the 2nd Artillery is keen to 
develop multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and ASATs to defeat 
missile defense programs initiated by the U.S.218 Strategic modernization of China‘s 
nuclear forces at a time when most of China‘s centers of gravity remain beyond the range 
of Indian missiles will pin the stability of nuclear deterrence on China‘s intentions and 
avowed nuclear doctrine.  
Some experts conjecture that with continued economic and scientific 
advancement and changes in threat perceptions, China may graduate from minimum to 
limited deterrence, capable of intra-war deterrence and controlled escalation. Similarly, 
skeptics question China‘s no-first-use pledge and fear that China may claim threats to its 
sovereignty to justify pre-emption as a strategically defensive act.219 In view of the 
foregoing, most Indian analysts recommend that a credible second strike capability 
against China will help assure stable Sino-India relations. India‘s successful test in 2007 
of the Agni III Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) which is capable of reaching 
most parts of China must be viewed in this context. Delhi has stated that the missile will 
only be armed with conventional payloads; however, the relevance of the 2007 test is not 
lost on anyone. Another potentially complicating factor is that China does not recognize 
India as a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS), hence leaving no scope, at present, for nuclear 
CBMs.220           
Still, China and India appear mindful of the need to build mutual trust between 
their militaries. Military CBMs which had taken somewhat of a back seat since 1996 
have been reinvigorated in recent times. In 2005, during Wen Jiabao‘s visit to India, 
‗Protocols on CBMs along the LAC‘ were signed, elucidating provisions to preserve 
peace and tranquility along the border. The protocols also institutionalized military 
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exchanges in almost all sectors along the disputed border.221 In 2006, during Indian 
Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee‘s visit to China, the first ever Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on Defense was signed, and the Minister also visited the Lanzhou 
MR. The MoU paved the way for joint military exercises between China and India in 
Kunming in 2007, and Belgaum in 2008. China and India have also been holding an 
Annual Defense Dialogue attended by senior functionaries from both sides since 2008.222 
While the actual value of most of these CBMs remains modest, they signify the 
realization in both camps that the perils of misperceptions can be severe. 
Snapshots of China‘s and India‘s military capabilities suggest a stable relationship 
buttressed by multiple levels of deterrence and CBMs. ―China‘s aspirations and plans for 
its military modernization program are commensurate to its location, size, wealth, 
national interests, and global role.‖223 China‘s relative military superiority and its drive to 
modernize imply that the current state of deterrence between China and India will be a 
case of constantly shifting goal posts. India will probably do well to keep reminding itself 
that it is not the prime target of China‘s military modernization, while still relying on the 
defensive advantages that accrue to it geographically. However, a prudent Indian strategy 
for 2020 must also incorporate potent conventional and nuclear deterrence.    
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C. QUEST FOR ENERGY RESOURCES 
 
Figure 12.   Energy Basket of China and India in 2005224 
China‘s ambition to increase its CNP is largely dependent on the continuation of 
its economic miracle, which in turn is dependent on ready access to energy resources. 
The relevance of energy security is also not lost on India. Future estimates suggest that 
China‘s and India‘s oil requirements will nearly double, and gas requirements are likely 
to quadruple by 2025. In the absence of adequate domestic sources of oil, China‘s and 
India‘s dependence on imports is likely to significantly increase from current rates of 
40% and 75%, respectively.225 This makes both countries increasingly sensitive to 
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international oil markets. China‘s apprehensiveness over its energy supply routes, and 
how this is a driver for its naval modernization and overtures in the IOR, has already 
been elaborated in the previous chapter. In this section I analyze the quest by China and 
India to gain direct access to energy resources. 
China and India have predominantly relied on the international oil markets for 
their energy requirements. At the margins, both countries have expressed the desire to 
have more control over energy supplies as well as an equity stake in the commodity 
market; this is what has been described by Jonathan Holslag as ―control over the well 
strategy.‖226 According to Holslag, the possibility of importing oil from their own fields 
will prove far more attractive to both China and India than being subject to the vagaries 
of international markets, and, as he points out, state oil companies are already in the 
vanguard of this effort for both countries. The dominant opinion of analysts is that China 
and India are predestined for hostile competition over energy resources. However, the 
observed behavior of both is perhaps best captured by the phrase, ―partners here – rivals 
there!‖227 
In the period 2004 to 2006, China outbid India at various auctions including those 
in Angola, Nigeria, Ecuador, and Kazakhstan. China‘s modus operandi was simple: it 
paid a higher price and did not shy away from combining several politico-strategic levers 
in a bid to lock in future supplies. As Amardeep Athwal explains, this competition 
unexpectedly fostered a new sense of interdependence once China and India realized that 
they were being played against each other by the sellers. Even when China found it easy 
to outbid India, it often fell short in competition with western oil companies. Moreover, 
control over the oil market by the western oil companies was so extensive that Asian 
countries had to pay up to $2-3 more per barrel of oil (known as the Asian oil 
premium).228 In 2006, China and India signed five MoUs on energy cooperation with  
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arrangements for joint bidding, confounding analysts by turning their much-vaunted 
rivalry into a nascent partnership. The MoUs also outlined proposals for joint exploration, 
pipelines, and backhaul cargoes.229 
Sudan was the first country where China and India joined hands to invest $700 
million in the Greater Nile Oil Project. An investment of $573 million to gain a 37% 
stake in the Petro Canada-owned al-Furat oilfield in Syria, and $800 million to gain a 
50% stake in Omimed de Colombia were some other successful joint bids made by China 
and India.230 GAIL (India) Ltd and China Gas Holdings signed a joint venture for 
Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) projects, city gas distribution, pipelines, and Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) in China, India, and third party countries.231 The negotiations for 
cooperation in developing the Yadavaran oil field in Iran, and the ambitious proposals to 
build interdependence via a gas pipeline from Russia to India through China, and another 
pipeline from Iran to China through India, may at this stage seem farfetched, and subject 
to geopolitics beyond Sino-India bilateral relations.232 Whether this signals nothing but 
cooperation also depends on one‘s perspective. As P. R. Kumaraswamy points out, China 
has cooperated with India only in projects that were susceptible to international criticism, 
or when it required added clout to compete with western oil giants. When otherwise 
unconstrained by external factors, China has leveraged its strengths to outmaneuver 
India, as has been the case with Bangladesh and Myanmar.233 
China and India have expressed a shared interest in developing renewable energy 
resources, and promoting energy conservation. China aims to increase the share of its 
non-conventional energy sources to 20% of its energy basket.234 In 2003, China and India 
signed three MoUs for cooperation in the fields of science and technology. The most 
important amongst these was the MoU for cooperation in the field of renewable energy, 
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followed by a number of Track 1 and 2 initiatives for greater collaboration. In the present 
context, coal is a major source of energy for both countries, and both are keen to develop 
clean coal technologies to address energy and environmental concerns.235 The support 
given to such initiatives at the highest level is indicative of, cooperation not just in the 
field of technology but, burgeoning economic rapprochement.  
D. SINO-INDIA ECONOMIC INTERACTION  
As with some of the dimensions of energy development, the process of economic 
rapprochement between the two countries is likely to help create an emerging elite 
consensus, institutional mechanisms, impetus for (and from) private economic actors, 
increased bilateral trade, and trade complementarities. However, as will also become 
clear in this section, India‘s increasing trade deficit, less than ideal division of labor, and 
apprehensions over Chinese investments in sensitive sectors could still pose impediments 
to real interdependence. Bilateral trade is not a silver bullet for Sino-India relations. 
Nevertheless, trade does give China and India an opportunity to revel in absolute gains, 
and frame their relationship based on a fresh narrative.  
1. Elite Consensus and Institutional Mechanisms 
Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee‘s visit to China in 2003 raised the expectations of 
greater economic interactions between the two countries, and Wen Jiabao‘s visit to India 
in 2005 resulted in the conclusion of a strategic partnership with India, and further 
deepened economic ties. During this latter visit, two key agreements were signed that laid 
out political guiding principles for solving the border issue, and five-year planning on 
China-India all round trade and economic cooperation.236 In 2006, 130 entrepreneurs took 
part in a China-India CEO forum designed to bring the business communities together.237 
Wen Jiabao‘s visit in 2005 also paved the way for recognition of Sikkim as part of India 
by China, and for the consequent opening of border trade at Nathu La in 2006 in a bid to 
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revive the ancient Silk Route.238 While it can be conceded that the real value of border 
trade has been insignificant, the event was laden with symbolism. In 2005, Jairam 
Ramesh coined the word Chindia to express the intriguing possibilities of historic, 
cultural, and economic symbiosis between the two countries.239 Prime Minister Dr. 
Manmohan Singh, the architect of India‘s economic liberalization, studied the benefits of 
international trade for China for his PhD thesis at the University of Cambridge. It can be 
no surprise, then, that the current Indian leadership appears positive for staying the course 
in terms of stronger economic interactions with China.240 Indeed, it can even be argued 
that economic cooperation has been pushed forward by political elites of both countries 
in a bid to normalize bilateral relations: trade in fact does seem to follow the flag!  
Sino-India economic relations have subsequently been institutionalized within the 
government at three levels: the India-China Joint Group on Economic Relations, Trade, 
Science and Technology at the Ministerial level; the Joint Study Group at the Secretary 
level; and, a Joint Working Group supported by a Joint Business Council at the Joint 
Secretary level.241 The establishment of the Business Council has ensured that private 
interests and corporate initiatives deepen convergences. Several provincial governments, 
such as those of West Bengal and Assam in India and Yunan in China, are also seeking 
economic partnerships at the sub-state level, and press their respective central 
governments for greater cooperation. These developments have resulted in a number of 
structural-functional pressures to continue economic cooperation for mutual gain. 242 
2. Bilateral Trade 
Bilateral trade between China and India was discontinued following the 1962 
War. The trade was resumed in 1977 at a paltry $2.45 million; in 1987 trade was still 
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modest at $123.5 million; and, only in 1995, reached $1 billion for the first time.243 The 
bilateral trade between China and India was so insignificant that John W. Garver‘s 
authoritative book on Sino-India relations in the 20
th
 century, Protracted Contest, 
scarcely mentions this facet.244 However, over the past decade, Sino-India bilateral trade 
became so important it is recognized as the most reliable and beneficial instrument of 
political rapprochement. For instance, after the brief hiatus in Sino-India relations 
following India‘s nuclear tests, trade was the first bilateral relationship to bounce back to 
its normal pace. From approximately $2 billion in 2001, trade surpassed $40 billion in 
2009, with China replacing the U.S. as India‘s largest trading partner.245 By 2010, trade 
had crossed the $60 billion mark, prompting both sides to revise the target for 2015 to 
$100 billion. Analysts like Jonathan Holslag have measured indicators such as bilateral 
agreements, dialogues, ministerial visits, and visas to demonstrate that the rise in bilateral 
trade is resulting in greater interdependence, while others, like Amardeep Athwal, are 
optimistic that this trend has the potential to transform relations from a framework of 
rivalry to cooperation.246  
One positive indicator of Sino-India trade is that various entrepreneurs have 
started to invest in each other‘s country through private or joint ventures. Indian 
companies in IT training (NIIT and APTECH), software solutions (Infosys, Wipro, and 
TCS), pharmaceuticals (Ranbaxy, and Dr. Reddy‘s), and banking (SBI, and ICICI) have 
set up shop in China, and Chinese companies such as Huawei and Haier have entered 
India‘s markets.247 The Tatas have developed a special port and steel plant in Orissa to 
meet Chinese demands, and the Reliance group used its political influence to accelerate 
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the granting of visas to Chinese executives hired for a gas pipeline project.248 Strides like 
these would not have been possible without political initiatives; however, in recent years 
business players have started to, in turn, influence the tone and tenor of political 
interactions. 
Various economists have analyzed China‘s and India‘s comparative advantages in 
trade and the prospect they hold for further economic cooperation. The Complementarity 
Index, measured on a scale of zero to one, has increased from 0.38 in 1996 to 0.6 in 2007; 
this is indicative of India‘s strength in raw and semi-processed commodities, and China‘s 
specialization in low to mid-level manufactured goods.249 While India‘s exports to China 
are dominated by basic materials such as ores, slag, ash, iron, steel, and plastics, China‘s 
exports to India comprise manufactured goods, electronics, and electrical machinery.250 
The Trade Intensity Index (TII), which measures the potential for bilateral trade, and 
economic Gravity Models that take into account the size and proximity of trading nations, 
estimate that there is a potential for at least a 25% increase in Sino-India bilateral trade.251 
China‘s strength in manufacturing and India‘s growth in services is creating new 
synergies. Hence, a Motorola or Cisco product may be labeled Made in China, but the 
software in all instances may have been developed in India.252 
Some analysts have suggested that since both countries rely on FDI and exports 
for their economic development, this will lead to competition between them. In 2006, 
China received $72 billion in FDI, whereas India received less than half that amount. The 
Indian Planning Commission has stated that the country requires more than $350 billion 
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in investments for infrastructure, and FDI must climb to approximately 4% of GDP.253 
The Chinese diaspora accounts for nearly 50% of all FDI flowing to China, compared to 
10% from Indians settled abroad. While this may be a result of domestic economic 
policies, the statistic signifies that the primary sources of FDI for both countries are not 
the same.254 In terms of exports to third markets, the goods in which China and India hold 
Revealed Comparative Advantages (RCA) are mostly in different sectors, with a bare 
25% overlap. Therefore, their current export profiles are complementary and do not point 
toward competition.255      
Nevertheless, as is often the case, the truth of the matter may well lie not just in 
what has been achieved, but in what has yet to be achieved. In 2005, China announced 
that it was ready for an FTA with India. India, for its part, took a cautious stance and 
adopted a graduated response. Similarly, while China and India seek FDI and 
opportunities to invest elsewhere, their overall investments in each other‘s country are 
insignificant. Worth examining, then, are the reasons for these anomalies. Two stand out: 
the asymmetric nature of Sino-India trade, and India‘s security concerns over Chinese 
investments in sensitive sectors. 
India‘s trade deficit with China is the main reason for its cautious approach 
toward an FTA: as bilateral trade has grown from approximately $2 billion in 2000 to 
$40 billion in 2009, India‘s deficit has also grown from approximately $1 billion to $20 
billion (See Figure 13). 
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Figure 13.   Asymmetric Nature of Sino-India Bilateral Trade256 
 Some economists point to China‘s dumping practices and currency devaluation as 
sources of this disequilibrium, but the reasons are more complex. Firstly, China‘s and 
India‘s shares in their bilateral trade are a reflection of their shares in global trade; in fact, 
India‘s exports to China have risen at a faster rate than India‘s total exports. Secondly, 
the makeup of the trade basket, with India exporting primary products and China 
exporting value added products, is such that the trade is more beneficial to China. 
Thirdly, India‘s inability to compete in manufacturing is due to its own weaknesses in 
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governance and infrastructure, and its archaic labor laws, and cannot be blamed on China. 
Lastly, tariff rates are higher in India than China. Thus, the fear is that establishment of 
an FTA will only fortify an already strong Chinese position.257  
Irrespective of which explanation one prefers the fallout from these disparities is 
that some business lobbies in India are less than excited about trade with China. 
Economic interdependence also assumes that the trade is equally important to both 
partners. Although China is India‘s largest trading partner, India does not figure even in 
the top ten of China‘s trading partners.258 While China‘s share in India‘s overall trade has 
risen from approximately 2% in 2000 to 9% in 20009, India‘s share in China‘s overall 
trade stands at less than 2% (although India‘s share has also quadrupled from 
approximately 0.5% in the year 2000).    
One factor that contributes to making China and India complementary trading 
partners is the current division of labor: China specializes in hardware, and India is strong 
in software; India exports primary products, and China sells manufactured products. 
Skeptics point out that this division of labor is neither static nor in India‘s long term 
interest. The sale of natural resources to China may not be politically sustainable in the 
long run: in 2007 Indian steel companies lobbied to discourage the sale of iron ore to 
China, persuading the Indian government to raise export duties that in turn invited strong 
protests from China.259 Moreover, India‘s service led growth is not adequately inclusive, 
and denies value addition or job creation along the same scale as the manufacturing or 
agricultural sectors. Conversely, China also aspires to develop its software industry. 
Taken together, these factors may dilute the current complementarity over time.   
World Trade Organization (WTO) trade statistics for 2010 indicate that China is 
#1 in merchandise exports, controlling nearly 12.7% of the world total; India, in 
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comparison, is only at # 15 with a mere 1.7% of the world‘s total.260 These statistics 
imply that even if India injects a new energy into its manufacturing sector, it will not be 
in a position to challenge China for a long time to come. A more important point that 
skeptics overlook is the potential for intra-industry trade; for example, more than 60% of 
all U.S.-EU trade is intra-industry.261 A 2005 International Monetary Fund (IMF) working 
paper indicates that the Index of Specialization of China and India is diversified at the 
sub-heading level; hence, there is great potential for horizontal intra-industry trade.262 The 
same sentiment is shared by Indian economists such as Arvind Virmani and Amita 
Batra.263 For instance, within biotechnology, India specializes in medicine and 
pharmaceuticals, whereas China specializes in agro-biotechnology; within services, India 
specializes in IT-enabled services, whereas China specializes in travel services; within 
software, India specializes in solutions, whereas China specializes in products; and within 
health services, India is known for yoga and ayurveda, whereas China is known for 
acupressure and reflexology. Similar sub-heading level diversification is evident even in 
textiles, a key sector for both China and India.264 Therefore, while we can concede that as 
China and India aspire to further their service and manufacturing sectors, which could 
jeopardize their current complementarity, there are also numerous intra-industry 
possibilities they can nurture.  
A more worrisome aspect of the Sino-India economic relationship is the meager 
investment by both economies in each other‘s turf. Until 2007, India had invested 
approximately $178 million in China; the FDI from China into India has been only $17 
million, as compared to, for example, $90 billion from Japan and $400 million from 
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Taiwan.265 During 1991–2000, China contracted FDI worth $225 million in India, but the 
actual inflow was only 0.56 million!266 Arguably, the chief reason for this sluggish pace is 
that the Indian government has been extremely wary of Chinese investments in sensitive 
sectors such as telecommunications, ports and infrastructure, and transportation. In 2006, 
Hutchison Port Holdings and China Harbor Engineering Corporation were denied port 
operations in India, and Huawei and ZTE Corporation were similarly thwarted in the 
telecommunication sector.267 While India has been invoking security considerations to 
limit Chinese investments, China has been far more relaxed about Indian investments. 
E. WHITHER COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE? 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye identify three main characteristics of 
complex interdependence: First, multiple channels connect societies; the use of force 
against a state with which one has diverse relations is likely to rupture mutually profitable 
ties. Second, there is no rigid hierarchy among bilateral issues. The viability of military 
force depends upon the passion a particular issue generates. At the same time, military 
force may not always be relevant to resolve competition over economic issues; this leads 
to their third characteristic, that military force becomes less relevant.268 Keohane and Nye 
insist that in a realist world, military security will be the dominant goal of states, whereas 
in the world of complex interdependence, transnational and trans-governmental relations 
will ensure that national interests will be defined differently, at different times.269  
If we imagine realism and complex interdependence as a continuum, Sino-India 
relations have moved away from the purely realist end. This move was inspired by a 
political process mindful of the high costs of military conflict, and keen to downplay the 
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significance of bilateral issues with a security edge to them. The process has been 
buttressed by growing bilateral trade and institutional linkages that have created 
structural pressures for cooperation. Perhaps the most unexpected feature of this new 
phase of the relationship has been a willingness to jointly bid for energy resources in 
select cases. At the very least, Sino-India economic relations have provided a new 
framework through which to analyze and further bilateral progress, which is no 
insignificant achievement.  
Meanwhile, despite what signs of complex interdependence might suggest, 
military force is still relevant in Sino-India relations. Military modernization by China, 
even if not aimed at India, has the potential to disturb the current stability; the challenge 
for India is to ensure deterrence without intensifying the security dilemma. The current 
asymmetry in trade, likely competition over energy sources, and lack of substantial 
investment in each other‘s country can be considered the main impediments to pushing 
forward with interdependence. More intra-industry trade and joint research into 
renewable energy sources are some measures that both countries can take. However, real 
progress is only likely to be made if the political leadership can take the next leap, which 
is to link the two countries through gas pipelines, and investments in each other‘s 
sensitive sectors. This will no doubt depend on both sides trusting each other over future 
intentions, which themselves will depend on the resolution of territorial disputes and 
regional geopolitics. Figuratively, one can say that in the 21
st
 century, the high politics of 
military security have ceded ground to the low politics of economics. Commerce has 
bravely altered the dynamics of Sino-India relations beyond all imagination. 
Nevertheless, one has to be concerned that, by 2020, all the low hanging fruit will have 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis has been to explore the prospects of Sino-India 
relations in 2020 by examining historical trends in bilateral relations since 1947, and by 
bringing to bear relevant IR theories. Recognizing the inherent limitations of any single 
theory to explain the complexity of international relations, I borrowed the idea of analytic 
eclecticism to transcend the rigid boundaries of various paradigms and emphasize an 
integrated problem-oriented approach. Sino-India relations are comprised of an intricate 
web of interests, to include sovereignty, nationalism, power, wealth, status, influence, 
honor, security, and legitimacy. Consequently, I have focused particularly on China and 
India‘s unresolved territorial dispute, regional geopolitics, and economic interactions as 
the major variables affecting Sino-India relations. 
One possible conclusion is that the territorial dispute, regional geopolitics, and 
economic competition, catalyzed by misperceptions, will ensure that Sino-India relations 
will remain competitive in nature. However, the high cost of war, growing economic 
interaction, and the imperative for peaceful economic development will also help keep 
the level and nature of competition to a pragmatic level through 2020. I would define 
pragmatic competition as the state of relations marked by negotiations short of 
reconciliation, along with substantial engagement by government and non-government 
organizations. Worth noting is that nations engaged in pragmatic competition continue to 
factor in the ‗other‘ as a potential enemy for military planning purposes. Thus, incidents 
of violence cannot be ruled out, but should be few and far in between.  
Because the empirical research presented in the thesis has been cross-sectional, 
and based on the aforesaid variables, it seems useful to offer a longitudinal synthesis of 
the transition in Sino-India relations from a state of hot war in 1962 to Cold War in the 
1970s and 1980s, through growing pragmatism and budding economic interdependence 
in the twenty-first century. I will follow this with a revisit of competing IR theories, the 
results of a game theory simulation of Sino-India relations, and my prognosis for Sino-
India relations in 2020. Finally, I will conclude by answering two questions: under what 
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circumstances might the current state of pragmatism be disturbed? And what can be done 
to maintain (pragmatism) or improve Sino-India bilateral relations? 
A. LONGITUDINAL SYNTHESIS 
The history of Sino-India bilateral relations since 1947 can be dissected into five 
phases. 
1. Phase 1: 1949 to 1964 – Sino-India War 
The first phase of Sino-India relations begins with China‘s annexation of Tibet in 
1950. During this period, Nehru‘s vision of Afro-Asian solidarity has as its fulcrum Sino-
India friendship. The Bandung conference of 1955 inadvertently highlights the 
geopolitical and ideological divides between the two countries. The border dispute, the 
Dalai Lama‘s exodus to India in 1959, and, finally, India‘s Forward Policy culminate in 
the Sino-India War in 1962. In 1963, China resolves its borders with Pakistan, and enters 
into an alliance which has since become one of the most enduring features of Chinese 
foreign policy. This phase ends with Nehru‘s death in May 1964, and China‘s detonation 
of its first nuclear weapon in October of the same year.  
In sum, we can say that some of the most important elements to define Sino-India 
relations for the succeeding fiftyyears are revealed during this opening phase of the two 
countries‘ interaction: perceived threats to territorial sovereignty; China‘s sensitivity over 
Tibet; each country‘s struggle for power, status, and influence within Asia; 
misperceptions about each other‘s intentions; the Sino-Pak nexus; and China‘s efforts to 
modernize its military.  
2. Phase II: 1965 to 1977 – Cold War and the Sino-Pak Nexus 
The Cold War years in Sino-India relations roughly coincide with Mao‘s Cultural 
Revolution, the Sino-Soviet split, Sino-U.S. rapprochement, and Indo-Soviet cooperation. 
Therefore, this period serves as a reminder of how Sino-India relations are influenced by 
domestic events, as well as larger geopolitics. This phase is also notable for the 
strengthening of Sino-Pak ties to the extent that, from the 1965 Indo-Pak War onwards, 
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Indian planners have to factor a threat of war on two fronts into their strategic calculus. 
China‘s unwillingness to get directly involved during the 1971 Indo-Pak War can be 
attributed to its balance of power calculations, and India‘s better defense preparedness. 
However, China‘s strategy of constraining India through Pakistan firms up during these 
years. One example: China‘s assistance to Pakistan‘s nuclear program, coming shortly 
after India‘s ‗peaceful‘ nuclear test in 1974, is in line with the antagonistic mood of the 
times, and remains one of the thorniest issues in China‘s and India‘s bilateral relations. 
Bilateral trade resumes in 1977, but is insignificant.  
3. Phase III: 1978 to 1987 – Four Modernizations and the High Costs of 
War 
Deng Xiaoping‘s ascendance to the main stage of Chinese politics proves a major 
turning point not only in the evolution of the PRC, but his focus on economic 
development has positive fallout for Sino-India relations. China decides to stop 
supporting insurgencies in India‘s North East, and takes a neutral stand on Kashmir. 
During this period China also resolves most of its territorial disputes, except with India! 
China flirts with the idea of resolving the Sino-India territorial dispute through a swap 
formula; however, China‘s disinclination to make a formal proposal, and its intransigence 
over Tawang, are read by India as signs of China‘s strategic ambiguity. India‘s grant of 
statehood to Arunachal Pradesh in 1986 leads to a military standoff with the PLA in 
1987; the crisis is averted due to mutual recognition of the high costs of war. The 
different end-states of border confrontations during 1962 and 1967, by 1987 reaffirm the 
relevance of deterrence in the minds of Indian policy makers. From this point onwards, 
the competition between China and India will be less in terms of direct military 
confrontation, and will shift instead to geopolitics and economics.        
4. Phase IV: 1988 to 1998 – Political Rapprochement and Regional 
Geopolitics 
Rajiv Gandhi‘s visit to Beijing in 1988 lays the foundation for Sino-India 
rapprochement, and decouples the border dispute from economic cooperation. The 
treaties signed in 1993 and 1996 further lower tensions between the two adversaries and, 
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in 1995, bilateral trade reaches $1 billion for the first time. Geopolitically, China starts to 
build strong relations with the littoral states in the IOR, such as Myanmar, in order to 
expand its influence and address its Malacca Dilemma. The accuracy of descriptions 
about China‘s String of Pearls strategy (a phrase coined in 2004) eventually will be 
disproved. However, China‘s forays in the IOR continue to worry Indian analysts. India‘s 
economically motivated Look East Policy is launched in 1992; soft balancing against 
China is implicit in it. What also emerges from diplomatic and economic posturing 
during this period is a pattern of hedging by the smaller countries in the region. In 1991, 
China observes the 1st Gulf War with unease, and pushes its own military modernization. 
Meanwhile, the anxiety created among ASEAN countries created by the Taiwan Straits 
crisis creates the strategic space within which India can carve out a suitable role for itself. 
Citing the threat from China and China‘s support to Pakistan as the major reasons for 
India‘s nuclear tests in 1998, sours India‘s relations with China. But, the political thaw 
powered by growing trade, resumes after a brief hiatus. 
5. Phase V: 1999 to 2009 – Economic Cooperation and Strategic 
Competition 
China‘s neutral stance during the Kargil War in 1999 and Operation Parakram in 
2002 are viewed as welcome gestures by India, but its military aid to Pakistan remains a 
sore point. Nonetheless, China seems to have managed the contradiction between 
improving relations with India while continuing to arm Pakistan quite deftly. 
Geopolitically, China has to contend with a stronger U.S. presence in Asia after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, to include the warming up of Indo-U.S. ties through the Framework for 
Defense Cooperation in 2005 and Civil Nuclear Deal inked in 2008. On the bilateral 
front, Prime Minister Vajpayee‘s visit to Beijing in 2003, and the reciprocal visit by Wen 
Jia Bao to India in 2005, ushers in path-breaking progress in building stronger political 
and economic ties.   
India‘s reaffirmation that the TAR is a part of the PRC, and China‘s recognition 
of Sikkim as part of India, pave the way for resuming border trade at Nathu La in 2006. 
By 2009, China has become India‘s largest trading partner. Structural pressures and 
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growing economic interdependence have in turn bolstered bilateral relations, giving rise 
to new terms like Chindia. The nascent partnership between China and India in the 
energy and renewable energy fields prove both countries‘ ability to step out of their zero 
sum paradigms when doing so is mutually beneficial. The strategic partnership begun in 
2005, and the Shared Vision for the 21
st
 century released in 2008 are indicative of the 
role played by positive economics; but also, both reflect China‘s attempt to woo India 
away from the U.S.  
Of course, the glimmer of hope offered by all these events and ties can all too 
easily be eclipsed by a sense of déjà vu, such as when China reasserts its claim over the 
entire state of Arunachal Pradesh in 2006, or protests against the Dalai Lama‘s visit to 
Tawang in 2009. China‘s objections to India‘s admission to the EAS in 2005, and 
ambiguity over India acquiring a permanent seat in the UNSC, are viewed by New Delhi 
as indicative of China‘s largely unchanged strategic orientation toward India. Add to this 
the frantic pace of infrastructure development in Tibet, the inauguration of Gwadar port, 
increased border patrol violations since 2007, China‘s military modernization, and the 
growing trade deficit, and Indian strategists have reason to be concerned about China‘s 
future intentions. India‘s move to upgrade infrastructure along the LAC, its joint military 
exercises with the U.S. and Japan, and its quest for credible deterrence must be viewed in 
this context. In the overall analysis, the pragmatism developed during this period, while 
promising, can perhaps best be characterized as one of strategic competition and 
economic cooperation. 
B. TRIANGULATION OF REALIST-CONSTRUCTIVIST-LIBERAL 
VECTORS 
In terms of IR theories, Sino-India relations thrive in the triangulated space 
between realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Historical analysis reveals how these 
vectors are, on occasion, complementary and yet at other times pull in opposite 
directions. Like all bilateral relations, Sino-India relations must be viewed with all their 
paradoxes and contradictions.  
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Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer‘s analyses, rooted in power, assumptions 
of anarchy, and the imperative for self-help, certainly seem to explain Sino-India 
relations. One can see geopolitical competition in Asia evident in spheres of influence, in 
China‘s forays in the IOR, and in India‘s Look East Policy. One can also see balance of 
power strategies playing out in the Sino-Pak nexus, or India‘s internal and soft balancing. 
Alternatively, it seems equally clear that China and India are meshed in the kind of 
security dilemma explained by Robert Jervis: China‘s defensive motives can be gauged 
through its sensitivity over Tibet, the security of its SLOCs, and apprehensions of 
collusion between India and the U.S. For its part, India remains anxious about China‘s 
threat to its territorial integrity and its hegemonic designs. Hence, infrastructure 
development in Tibet and China‘s military modernization appear threatening to India. We 
could say that for both sides, cognitive traps, vital interests, and irreducible uncertainty 
make the security dilemma acute.  
China‘s constructs of being the middle kingdom; its century of humiliation 
marked by military weakness and unequal treaties; the extent to which it has tied its 
national honor and identity to Tibet; the degree to which internal cohesion is threatened 
by secessionist movements in Taiwan, and Xinjiang; and, regime legitimacy that hinges 
on the dichotomy of economic freedom and a lack of political reforms make China 
particularly sensitive to India‘s territorial claims, its protection of the Dalai Lama, and its 
perceived threat to China‘s SLOCs. Add to this Indian memory that Prime Minister 
Nehru championed the cause of Sino-Indian friendship only to be deceived, and it 
becomes clear that while realists have examples from recent history to fall back on, 
liberals face an uphill task. So much so that, despite a history spanning nearly two 
millennia during which Chinese and Indian civilizations prospered side by side, and 
engaged in economic, cultural, educational, and religious exchanges without any major 
hostilities, such amity tends to be lost from view. This is unfortunate because the adverse 
baggage of Sino-Indian relations is far less cumbersome than, let‘s say, Sino-Japanese 
history.     
Regular interactions in multilateral institutions and burgeoning trade have started 
to remind people of this positive history. What was until recently a debate only between 
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offensive and defensive realists is being transformed into a debate between realists and 
liberals. A diminution in the number and intractability of the issues on the agenda, as well 
as growing interdependence, are some of the tangible benefits that can be seen to accrue. 
But equally important is the intangible benefit of an opportunity to construct a novel 
paradigm which is not a zero sum game. It only seems prudent to recognize that the 
expectations from this interaction remain modest, and such hard won gains should serve 
as a warning against turning institutions and commerce into another source of conflict.  
C. GAME THEORY ANALYSIS OF SINO-INDIA RELATIONS 
China and India can be imagined to possess three strategic choices: Hostility (H); 
Pragmatism (P); Cooperation (C). The strategic game between the two countries can be 
viewed as an interaction between these policy choices, creating nine possible outcomes. 
The uncertainty over China‘s intentions may impel India to perceive China as having 
hostile leanings concealed in a pragmatic shell; while, India looks at itself as being 
genuinely pragmatic. Therefore, the strategic game between China and India will be 
visualized by an Indian policy maker as: 
 
 CHINA 
H P C 
INDIA 
H 3, 4 5,2 
8,1 (China‟s least 
preferred) 
P 2,7 7,6 







4,8       6,5 
Table 3.   Strategic Game between China and India 
Because Strategy C is dominated by the other two strategies, it is not likely to be 
played out under current conditions; in real terms, this implies that the fear of being 
deceived is greater than the perceived advantages of cooperation. The resultant dilemma 
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(See Table 4), wherein the preferred outcome (PP) is unstable and the Nash equilibrium 





H 3, 4 5,2 
P 2,7 7,6 
Table 4.   The Dilemma in Sino-India Relations 
A simple formulation reinforces two important findings about the prospects of 
Sino-India relations: the improbability of purely cooperative relations (CC) in the face of 
conflicting interests and uncertain intentions; and, the risk of ending in a hostile deadlock 
(HH), despite the fact that pragmatism (PP) is the optimal solution over the long haul.  
D. PROGNOSIS 2020 
This thesis has employed various heuristic models to analyze past bilateral 
relations. Issue-based process tracing, triangulation among IR theories, a longitudinal 
synthesis and, finally, a game theory formulation all lead to a prognosis of pragmatic 
competition as the most likely future for Sino-India relations.  
China is likely to be the second most powerful country in the world by 2020, well 
on its way to equaling the U.S. in terms of its CNP by mid-century. Until then, U.S. 
hegemony in Asia will continue, and will be the guarantor of peace. However, the 
realities of power transition between the U.S. and China may start to unfold by 2020. 
India is likely to be among the top 10 nations of the world, but both China and India will 
need to make their growth more inclusive, they will both need to improve the reach of 
governance, and they will likely both face secessionist forces. Thus, the primary focus of 
both countries will be internal; neither is likely to project power to change the status quo. 
The imperative for peaceful economic development will likely be maintained and is 
likely to be the greatest stabilizing factor. 
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The territorial conflict between China and India is unlikely to be resolved by 
2020, and the best both countries can do is to make it less relevant. Pragmatism will steer 
China and India away from hostilities, but, more ominously, the border issue will cast a 
shadow over other areas of cooperation. Recurrent rhetoric from Beijing, reiterating its 
claim over the entire Arunachal Pradesh, along with whatever border violations may 
occur will be seen by New Delhi as acts of willfully promoting strategic ambiguity. 
Internal balancing along the borders in terms of infrastructure and military deployments 
will be a constant feature of both countries‘ policies for the foreseeable future. The 
fourteenth Dalai Lama recently turned 75, and has expressed a desire to oversee his 
succession. The transition of this succession and its effects on Sino-India relations will 
probably play out by 2020, and may well become a source of acrimony. 
While Sino-Pak friendship may bring economic and political stability to Pakistan, 
which will be welcome from India‘s perspective, conventional and nuclear military aid to 
Pakistan that emboldens its strategy of proxy war against India will embitter Sino-India 
rapprochement. Regional geopolitics will place China and India in competition with each 
other, but their economic interactions and hedging by smaller countries should prevent 
hostilities. China and India can be expected to cooperate on certain issues like global 
trade and global warming, but compete on issues related to the global security 
architecture. Any future attempt by China to establish permanent military bases in India‘s 
neighborhood, and its stand on India‘s bid for UNSC membership, will be taken as 
indications of its strategic orientation. India‘s strategic partnership with the U.S. will 
likewise be viewed with suspicion by Beijing, leading China to devise its own carrot and 
stick policy to shape India‘s choices. 
The asymmetry between China‘s and India‘s military capabilities may grow acute 
by 2020. India has three choices when confronted by such a situation: make unilateral 
concessions and resolve its outstanding differences with China; modernize its own 
military and maintain credible deterrence; or, build an alliance with regional players 




combine all three, with three qualifications: it will not negotiate on core issues such as 
inhabited areas along the disputed border; it will not get into an arms race; and, it will 
prefer soft balancing over hard balancing. 
Fortunately, the economy is like a gust of fresh air, helping further thaw Sino-
India relations. Bilateral trade and cooperation in the fields of science and technology, 
and renewable and clean energy especially, holds immense potential for both countries. 
However, India‘s disproportionate trade deficit and reluctance to allow Chinese 
investment in sensitive sectors will limit economic interdependence, and may also reveal 
each country‘s assessment of the other‘s intent and thus point to the real health of the 
bilateral relationship. 
E. UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS WILL THE THESIS BE FALSIFIABLE? 
This prognosis about the pragmatism that is likely to continue to characterize 
Sino-India relations may be disturbed by a change in any of the major variables. 
Relations could either grow totally cooperative or become blatantly hostile.  
A breakthrough in the border dispute akin to China‘s recognition of Sikkim in 
2006; trade and energy interdependence buttressed by transcontinental pipelines; and/or 
transformation of BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) nations into a strategic alliance are 
some of the conditions under which Sino-India relations could improve dramatically. 
However, each of these situations appears improbable in the short and medium term. 
In contrast, certain domestic, bilateral, and international situations might push 
Sino-India relations towards hostility. On the domestic front, an economic slowdown in 
China, either due to it overheating or to the paradox of China‘s economic reforms 
coupled with a lack of political freedom, might threaten its cohesion, and could push the 
Communist Party to assume an antagonistic stance toward neighbors such as India in a 
desperate bid to maintain its legitimacy. On the bilateral front, the balance might instead 
be tipped, accidentally—which is one reason to seek more CBMs—or, an aggressive turn 
in Tibetan nationalism could trigger trouble. In terms of economics, hostile trade and 
energy policies have the potential to scuttle the hope generated by liberals. Fierce 
competition over water is another possibility since many Indian rivers originate in Tibet.  
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More regionally, instability emanating from Pakistan could prove beyond China‘s 
control or influence; or, even worse, Beijing‘s intentional nurturing of Islamabad to 
counter Indo-U.S. friendship could have ominous consequences for Sino-India relations. 
In the larger geopolitical context, a violent turn of events inspired either by Chinese 
misadventures in the Taiwan Straits or U.S. attempts to contain a rising power and 
preserve its lone superpower status could also alter Sino-India relations for the worse. 
Alternatively, the U.S. might see the writing on the wall with respect to the inevitability 
of China‘s rise to superpower status, and feel impelled by its own economic vulnerability 
to cede Asia to China as China‘s sphere of influence. While each of these possibilities 
appears unlikely from the present vantage point, each still deserves attention.  
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIA 
The strategic game between China and India, as depicted in the game theory 
formulation, can be resolved through a first move or a promise by China; this would allay 
India‘s suspicions over China‘s strategic ambiguity. In the absence of credibility or due to 
a stalemate during parleys, the best alternative would be to alter the game to arrive at a 
strategic configuration whereby PP is the only pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium 
available. Thus, the game has to be altered to reduce China‘s utility for H, and raise the 
utility of P for both China and India. 
 
  CHINA 
H P 
INDIA 
H 2,2 6,3 
P 3,6 8,7 
Table 5.   An Altered Sino-India Strategic Game 
This altered formulation reinforces a three-pronged strategy to stabilize the 
pragmatism in Sino-India relations: build trust; ensure credible deterrence; and, promote 
economic and regional cooperation. The recommendations for India are based on the  
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reality of China‘s rise to great power status, and the assertion that a stable Pakistan and 
pragmatic relations with China will be to India‘s ultimate benefit. To be forthcoming 
without appearing weak must be India‘s mantra.    
1. Build Trust Through CBMs and Costly Signaling 
India must accept that its intransigence over the border conflict, its support to the 
Tibetan government in exile, nuclear tests, its position along China‘s SLOCs through the 
Indian Ocean, and Indo-U.S. cooperation genuinely threaten China‘s sense of security. 
India must be willing to make tradeoffs on the boundary issue, but maintain its stance of 
not negotiating over the status of inhabited areas. Cooperative border management 
frameworks and border trade must be encouraged. The current policy of acknowledging 
China‘s sovereignty over TAR must be maintained; to do otherwise will amount to 
aggressive behavior from a Chinese perspective, with few corresponding benefits for 
India.  
India must also maintain its avowed principle of No First Use of nuclear weapons, 
backed by assured second-strike capability. For its part, China must acknowledge the 
reality of India‘s nuclear weapon status, thus opening the way to nuclear CBMs. The 
CBMs undertaken along the LAC have had the desired effect on Sino-India relations thus 
far, and must be expanded to include mechanisms to mitigate inadvertent crises. 
Similarly, a new set of CBMs is required to prevent a face-off in the IOR. At the same 
time, India must express its reservations about permanent Chinese military bases in the 
IOR in unequivocal terms. Anti-piracy and counter-terrorism operations provide the two 
navies an opportunity to cooperate; this should help address China‘s insecurity over its 
SLOCs.  
Tourism and cultural and educational exchanges must be explored to promote 
cross-cutting ties.270 India‘s gift of a Buddhist temple to China to commemorate sixty 
years of bilateral relations, and the proposal to establish an International University at 
                                                 
270 The idea of cross-cutting ties as a means for conflict management has been borrowed from Dr 
Anna Simons‘ class on Anthropology of Conflict (SO 3750) at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California. 
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Nalanda, an ancient twelfth-century center of higher learning, are steps in the right 
direction. China and India need to jointly construct a narrative that highlights peaceful 
coexistence over centuries. This would help make the 1962 War appear to be nothing 
more than a minor aberration.  
China and India must maintain their faith in market mechanisms for their energy 
needs, and avoid falling for a zero sum paradigm. The need to assure Beijing that the 
Indo-U.S. partnership is not aimed at China will be difficult, but necessary. Essentially, 
India will have to gauge China‘s intentions via border negotiations, China‘s military 
modernization and deployments in the IOR and Tibet, its support for India‘s candidature 
in the UNSC, its willingness to address the bilateral trade imbalances, and its energy 
policies.  
2. Deterrence Through Internal and Soft Balancing 
Realizations about the high cost of war are what have moved Sino-Indian 
relations from a state of hostility to pragmatism. Hence, misconceptions about a cheap 
and easy victory or sudden reappearance of windows of opportunity must be avoided. 
While accepting China‘s security dilemma, India must not discount the possibility that 
China is misrepresenting its intentions and might reveal hegemonic designs in the future. 
Geography, in the form of the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean, provides India certain 
defensive advantages that must be maintained. China‘s infrastructure development in 
Tibet and naval modernization might put stresses on these advantages. This is why India 
must develop its infrastructure, surveillance capabilities, and rapid deployment forces. 
India must also instill constructive nationalism amongst the tribes of Arunachal Pradesh 
to make conquest by China untenable. India‘s strong internal position will make it less 
vulnerable, more confident, and less suspicious of China‘s intentions.  
Modern technology and warfare make it difficult to differentiate weapons systems 
as either offensive or defensive. For this reason, China and India must limit the 
deployment of offensive forces, e.g., SRBMs/MRBMs, in each other‘s vicinity. China is 
responsive to balance of power considerations; while India‘s soft balancing with ASEAN 
and Japan is likely to have a favorable impact on Sino-India relations, hard balancing 
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might cause relations to deteriorate. India must walk this fine line in its diplomatic 
relations, and not sign up for something it cannot pursue alone. China, for its part, must 
be sensitive to the ‗K‘ (Kashmir) and ‗N‘ (nuclear) words in its relationship with 
Pakistan. China might assume that it has managed the contradiction of a thaw with India 
while arming Pakistan, and thus lose sight of the fact that India‘s strategy toward China 
will be contingent upon its estimate of China‘s intentions, which in turn will be judged on 
the basis of its ties with Pakistan.   
3. Economic and Regional Cooperation  
Bilateral trade must be allowed to mature as the most reliable and mutually 
beneficial CBM, and not be held hostage to the broader competition in other areas. China 
must be sensitive to India‘s growing trade deficit due to China‘s dumping practices and 
currency manipulation, but India must also acknowledge that its lack of competitiveness 
in the manufacturing sector is a function of its own archaic policies. China and India must 
explore the possibilities of horizontal intra-industry trade, and not just stick to the current 
notion of complementarity between China‘s hardware and India‘s software, or China‘s 
manufacturing and India‘s resources. Joint research and development in the fields of 
science and technology, especially renewable energy resources, can elevate relations to a 
new plane.  
Since the jury is still out on China‘s future intentions, India will be well advised 
to prevent Chinese entry into its sensitive sectors even at the cost of not achieving 
complete interdependence. China and India have similar interests on issues such as global 
warming, and the architecture of the global economy, and must assume leadership in G-
20 or WTO negotiations. As was highlighted earlier in the thesis, the competition 
brewing in Myanmar over China‘s attempt to connect Kunming to the Indian Ocean, and 
India‘s push to connect its North East to Southeast Asia, can actually be turned into an 
avenue of cooperation by connecting India‘s North East to China‘s South West! That 
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